
IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED HEA
AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH AND DWELT AMONG US

REALITY

WINTER, 1952

REALITY

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cum permissu superiorum

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God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.

Pius XII

Encyclical Humani Generis

ST. PETER MARTYR

(Sermon on the occasion of the seventh centenary of his martyrdom, delivered at St. Peter Martyr Prior, Winona, Minnesota, April 29, 1952.)

OUR OBSERVANCE of the seventh centennial of the martyrdom of St. Peter of Verona takes us back inevitably to the critical days which the Church had to face in his lifetime, the first half of the thirteenth century, in France and in northern Italy. There it became necessary energetically to root out a heresy, centuries old, which went by a variety of names derived either from the locality in which it flourished, from one one or another of its protagonists, or from one of its false doctrines. In the regions of St. Peter's preaching mission its adherents were called *Paterenes,* but a local Church Council in France finally gave the definitive name to that whole movement now familiar to us as the Albigensian heresy.

The heresy had originated in the East and worked its way gradually westward through individuals and communities. Though small at first, in the course of a century and a half it had taken such deep root, had gained so many adherents, wielded such political power, that it seriously menaced even the Catholic Faith of the people and the regions on which it battened. As an inevitable consequence it threatened to destroy the intellectual, political, and moral culture achieved in western Europe through the joint efforts of Church and State.

However novel the new religion may have seemed to a thirteenth century Catholic, it offered nothing really new. It propagated that error of Manicheism to which St. Augustine, as far back as the fifth century, had first clung but which he later repudiated and actively fought against. At bottom it was one of the wrong solutions to a problem that confronts the human mind in every age, the problem of good and evil. For the Manichean and the Albigensian the answer lay in a double principle of creation: one good principle, a good god, author of the spiritual creation and all the good things belonging to the order of spirits; the other a god of evil, the author of the material creation and all the evil things connected with it. Our souls, our spirits, are good. Our bodies, fashioned out of matter, are evil and so are all their works. In St. Peter's time, this doctrine was presented as a new and purified form of religion. Its proficients liked to be known as the Cathari, the Pure Ones, or the Puritans. In some respects they had an affinity with Puritans of a later age, at least in their intolerance of any kind of physical pleasure and the things that evoke such pleasure, all of which they considered evil.

The purified religion rejected the Church's authority, her doctrine, the hierarchy, the sacraments, and the Catholic manner of worship. Bishops, priests, and monks were likened to the Pharisees, blind leaders of the blind, whitened sepulchres. The State no less than the Church came under their attack; marriage since it involved material creatures, human bodies, was an evil thing and the begetting of children a monstrous crime. War under no circumstances could be justified. It was a sin to take an oath, and oaths played an important part in feudal society. Suicide was elevated to a kind of sacrament.

By the middle of the twelfth century these beliefs had become so widespread and the peril so alarming that in France decisive action was imperative. The Church's spiritual weapons proved unavailing and, with the coming of the thirteenth century, it was clear that the heresy must be put down by armed force. The resultant war ended, by what seems a miracle, in the rout of the heretics and the destruction of their power in France. But while the heresy lost its might for mischief as an organized entity, it survived here and there as a kind of underground. It was this hidden fragment, and the possibility of its resurgence to threaten faith and morals, that necessitated a judicial system which evolved after two or three decades into the institution of the Inquisition, a tribunal for the discovery, punishment, and prevention of heresy.

Only a few years before, the Order of Preachers had received the approbation of the Holy See; its purpose and availability, as well as the experience gained by its first members in the struggle with the heresy centering around Toulouse, predestined it to share in the functioning of this Tribunal, though it tried in vain to escape the burden. Through the officials of the Order the Holy See chose certain of the friars as Inquisitors, and one of the first of them was St. Peter.

Every noble life, every conspicuous career is the fruit of a preparatory stage which can be more or less clearly traced. This is one reason why the lives of saints, and of eminent men and women who have had a notable influence on the history of their times, are personally popular. Such biographies do not merely present us with a record of achievements but allow us to follow almost step by step the actor's progress to eminence. To have his life written at all, a man must have accomplished something worth while; how he came to do it, what were the outward circumstances as well as the inner motives and drives that led him to his place in history, is a matter of interest to all posterity.

In a general way there are three elements in the life of a man whose career has set him apart and above his fellows. To begin with, there is his original outfit, his own natural self, the raw material of his native abilities, the seeds of virtue which moral and mental education will later develop and which experience of life will firmly fix in a habitual spirit and character. And then there are the influences which inspire ideals and encourage the hope of realizing them. And finally there is the period that follows the fusion of these two, the time in which the great work of his life comes into a man's view with ever increasing clarity; a time when his will is inflexibly set, when all his energies are marshalled and disciplined to realize what he concieves to be the main object of his life.

These periods in St. Peter's life can be made out with almost chronological accuracy. His childhood gives promise of what his manhood would be like. His first biographers present him as an apt scholar of ardent temperament, generous, a sturdy and independent character (so much might be claimed to be his natural endowment). This much, however, might be claimed for many another small boy of that time in Verona. What is remarkable in St. Peter's case is the way in which divine grace developed these gifts of nature. God dealt with him almost visibly. He was born into a family infected with heresy; his parents were Albigensians and we would naturally expect him to be a foredoomed adherent of the sect. Instead he spent most of his life as its relentless and implacable enemy. His schooling began under a teacher who was a devout, earnest Catholic, one who nurtured the boy's faith and instilled in him the warm, loyal love for the Church of God that grew ever more and more intense with the passing years.

At that young and impressionable age he was undoubtedly familiar with his family's beliefs, learned from the conversation of his parents and relatives, and their friends among the heretics. When a heretic uncle found out that Peter had learned the Apostles' Creed he undertook to correct Peter's belief in God the Creator of heaven and earth, explaining that the material creation was the handiwork of the principle of evil. But he failed to move the youngster's faith and appealed to his father to take him out of the Catholic school he attended.

At the age of fifteen he was sent to Bologna to continue his education. There the second stage of his life began, for in that university he encountered the influence that was to inspire him with his life's ideal. He came to the great university city only a year or two after St. Dominic had established his Order there in the convent of St. Nicholas of the Vineyard. The community at St. Nicholas was already well known in Bologna and St. Dominic often preached at the priory on his visits there. The vicar of St. Nicholas, Blessed Reginald of Orleans, a man of exceptional charm, had brought into the community a sizeable number of vocations recruited not only from the student body but from the masters in the University as well. Several of the latter had been celebrated professors before their reception into the Order. St. Peter, therefore, would have known a good deal about the Order of Preachers from the common talk of his companions and associates regarding its origin, purpose, manner of life, and record of high achievement during its short existence. But it was only after hearing a sermon of St. Dominic, who had visited Bologna for the Chapter of 1221 and had preached in many churches and public places, that he decided to apply for admission to the Order.

For most of his life Peter had been a lone, solitary believer in the midst of a circle of heretics. Little wonder if the strife and fury their errors begot should dispose him to search for truth and to seize upon it when it came his way. Life in the university city, famous for the license and rowdy pleasures of its students — young men gathered from the four corners of Europe — surged around him but left him unsullied; and after his death his spiritual directors avowed that he had never lost his baptismal innocence. This was a serious, upright, devout young man with firsthand knowledge of the disorders that St. Dominic was dedicated to correct upon whom the words of the preacher fell. There was no violent passage from darkness to light, no sudden conversion from Satan to God. Here was one of the pure of heart, prompt to yield to the inspirations of the Holy Ghost, needing but a hint of what God's will desired from him in order to embrace it with all his heart and strength.

St. Dominic, on his side, recognized in this youth of sixteen or seventeen the qualities of mind and heart which under the impetus of God's grace would make him truly a champion of the faith and a light of the world, as Pope Honorius III had described the genuine Friar Preacher. So he forthwith clothed Peter in the Dominican habit and set him to the discipline that would fit him for the reception of the priesthood.

Here we come to the third period in the life of a man of high intelligence developed by sound education; a man of firm faith — tried, widened, and intensified by the circumstances of his heretical environment — who has ardently embraced the opportunity offered him to devote his life to the defense and propagation of the faith of Christ.

In accordance with St. Dominic's plan of campaign for souls doctrinal instruction of the brethren was essential. First and foremost in his educational program was adequate training in theology. As the course of studies then stood, Peter's education in the Sacred Science was based principally on the text of Sacred Scripture, supplemented by Peter Lombard's sentences, Peter Comestor's history, and some practical collection of cases of consciences for the guidance of the confessor. Not an elaborate curriculum by the standards of our day, but not often equalled in St. Peter's day. The Scripture course had a particular fascination and never lost its hold on him; like St. Dominic, he invariably carried some part of the sacred writings with him on every journey.

Studies were not the only element in the making of an apostle. Along with diligent application to lectures and books, Peter's student days were marked by the practice of severe mortifications, which he continued all his life. They were undertaken not only to bring the body into subjection by chastising it, following the example of St. Paul, but because penitential practices were in the spirit of the evangelical preacher, and this he aimed to be. It is not too much to say that the efficacy of his ministry depended on them.

The new band of preaching Friars stood on the threshold of a fervent Catholic revival, and none knew better than St. Peter the temper and needs of the times. The Catholic world was in a really desperate plight, for not yet had the future revival given more than a few faint stirrings of life. It was not only that pagan learning and philosophy were at work, poisoning the mind of the intellectuals and through them destroying the entire fabric of Christendom; it was not only that jealousy between states, the incessant strife and bitter quarrels of temporal lords, produced an atmosphere in which peaceful Christian worship and practice were suffocated. To such evils, and in part as a result of them, there was added widespread sensual indulgence and greed among all classes of people, not excepting the clergy. It was this state of affairs that provided the heretics with such persuasive arguments.

A favorite topic of heretical preachers was the wealth, the morals and the ignorance of the Catholic clergy. An easy and sure way to gain a hearing among the people was to launch a broadside at these targets. Even the devout listened gladly to these entertaining exposures and denunciations of corruption, and hence disposed themselves for the further instructions designed to convert them into disciples of these false apostles. Against this "corruption" of the Church they contrasted their own austere lives: their abstinence from meat, from wine, from everything that might be the means of physical pleasure, their detachment from the things of the world, their lives modeled on those of the Apostles and early Christians. In the circle of family and friends, young Peter was doubtless an uneasy listener to these attacks on the faith and morals of his fellow Catholics, adorned and illustrated with local names, places, and details. Nothing could have more strongly impressed him with the need for poverty, penance, austerity in the life of an effective Catholic preacher.

On the other hand, the common gossip among clergy and laity, the lectures of his professors in his theology classes must have informed him of the attempts of popes, councils, and bishops to stem the rising tide of error by preaching the gospel to the people and by providing the clergy with the education necessary for the discharge of their official duties. St. Dominic and his first disciples had been too closely connected with such reform measures not to have had them in the forefront of their minds. The friars were in fact the very vanguard of that reform; Toulouse had been the proving ground on which a plan of action took shape that was imposed on the universal church in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). All previous measures taken to enliven the pastoral ministry, to revive preaching, to provide the barest minimum of education for the clergy had failed. Itinerant preachers, men of great eloquence and often of great sanctity, had been too few in number to reach the multitude, too much on the move to effect any lasting good even among the comparative handful who heard them. The monks drafted for the cause were ill fitted for a task so alien to their vocation and their manner of life. The army of laymen, converts from heresy, which was mobilized in desperation by Innocent III met with a lukewarm reception and excited so much suspicion and ill feeling that their efforts were all but paralyzed.

As for raising the standard of clerical education, the modest program enjoined by the Third Lateran Council in 1179 which provided one teacher of grammar in the cathedral schools and one master of thelogy in a metropolitan diocese, remained for all practical purposes a dead letter. It was the experiment worked out at Toulouse under St. Dominic that provided the solution to the tormenting problem: a mobile company of preachers trained and educated for the express purpose of rooting out error, combating vice, teaching and preaching the faith. Part and parcel of their program was the penitential life. They traveled on foot, practiced evangelical poverty, gave the example in their own lives of the austerity and self-denial that cleared the ground for the rearing of the temple of Christian perfection. Doers of the word and not hearers of the word only, they could and did furnish a compelling argument against heresy.

St. Peter, then, by his severe life and tireless application to the prescribed studies was organizing his abilities and forces for the attainment of his ideal; he was in training for the apostolic life. By the time of his ordination he was ready for it. His biographies present him as a man of majestic appearance, of prodigious energy (the activities of a traveling preacher were necessarily strenuous even apart from self-imposed fastings, vigils, and taking of the discipline), and of magnetic personality. The moving eloquence of his preaching fell upon the souls of his hearers like the rains of spring, and was accompanied by the lightning of miracles. The results were reminiscent of the apostolic age. People flocked by thousands to see and hear him as he preached in churches and public squares, from the steps of public buildings, from any place that would accommodate the concourse of his eager listeners.

It is not surprising that when Gregory IX in 1233 established the tribunal to deal with offenses against the faith this popular and gifted friar should have been invested by papal authority with the wide powers of Inquisitor General in the region around Milan, Italy. He was one of the first to be selected for the work and the choice is a tribute to his learning, charity, and prudence — a combination rare in any man, but the more surprising in St. Peter since he was at that time about thirty years old.

Distortions regarding the nature and functions of the Inquisitor's office, the popular calumnies on the persons, character, and methods of the men who administered the tribunal, ought not to discredit the heroic service rendered not only to the faith but to society at large by such men as St. Peter. It was an office involving the most serious and delicate responsibilities. The Church, in consequence, was bound to use the utmost care and discretion in the selection of Inquisitors in order to assure herself that they were preeminently qualified to wield these powers which were so easily subject to abuse. The principal work of the Inquisitor General in the beginning was the organization of preaching on a grand scale, for the ecclesiastical and civil laws of procedure against heretics were perfected and applied only after St. Peter's death. During his lifetime, so little did the civil authority intervene in the affairs of heretics that they were unmolested in the councils they held, freely preached their errors, carried on their subversive functions in tranquility, and even had armed forces at hand. The conversion of Catholics who had lapsed into heresy depended on the vigor and eloquence of the preacher and the example he gave in his own life. As if to confirm this, there is no evidence that Peter ever turned over any heretic to the secular authority for punishment.

All that we know of St. Peter leads us to think of him as the ideal Inquisitor — as in later years the ideal was described for us by the inquisitors' handbooks of Bernard Guidonis and Nicholas Emerich. The Inquisitor must be erudite, zealous for the faith, unswayed by anger whatever the provocation, fearless in the face of hostility yet not inviting it, yielding neither to threats nor blandishments, charitable, merciful, with eyes ever turned to the salvation of souls.

Truth has demanded sacrifice in all ages, sometimes the sacrifice of what is treasured as one's dearest possession. St. Peter realized the power and the fruitfulness of sacrifice as a means of advancing truth and goodness. When he had cast in his lot with St. Dominic, he had made as a matter of course the sacrifice of all that might hold him earthbound. From the outset he knew that life as a crusading friar was full of personal danger, that martyrdom was a not unlikely possibility. It lay in the nature of the life he had chosen. Pope Honorius III, in his letter to St. Dominic and his brethren in January, 1217, a month after he had confirmed the new Order, earnestly and solemnly exhorted the men who had adopted the Dominican life to pursue their mission as preachers even, if necessary, to the giving of their lives.

It is said that St. Peter, in offering Mass, daily prayed that as Christ had shed His blood for him, he might be privileged to shed his blood for Christ. Once started on his career as Inquisitor his martyrdom became a probability; this grew into a practical certainty because of the fanaticism and intolerance of the heretics with whom he mingled. There were ruthless zealots among them with a frenzied hatred of the old and true religion. More than once they had shown that they would not stop at murder in defense of their errors. St. Peter had been compelled to organize and arm a militia in Florence and again in Milan to protest the Catholics against the fierce and bloody attacks made on them by their enemies.

Not long after his ordination as a priest three of his brethren, William Arnold, Bernard de Roche, and Garcia d'Aura, had been tricked into ambush and slaughtered in Avignon. He had early seen this as a foreshadowing of his own kind of death. He expected death, and prepared for it by such rigorous penances that his brethren had good reason to think that he would die of them. Then after years of fervent preaching and as he approached the end of his life, in the course of a sermon at the town of Cesena, he foretold his coming death and bade its people a last farewell. Undismayed by the danger of a heretic ambush he knew was laid for him, with a kind of holy impatience for death, he set out from the village of Como in Easter week of 1252 for Milan; he was waylaid by a hired assasin and done to death, summoning his last strength to write in the blood that flowed from his wounds: *Credo in unum Deum.*

By our Catholic standards, this martyrdom brought to a close a highly successful life. What were the qualities of its success? Not to disregard nor to minimize the miracles and wonders that put the seal of God's approval on his work (which might seem to place him outside the category of all common preachers and missionaries), his success was largely due to qualities which we, who tread in his steps at however great a distance, may certainly share. They can be summed up in a phrase: *fidelity to his vocation.* He never for a moment forgot, as appears in his boyhood and again in his death throes, that he possessed the divine gift of faith, and that he must cherish and defend that faith as the pearl beyond price. He knew that God had called him to publish, expound, and defend truths that revealed the mind and heart of God himself — even should the effort cost him his life. All the rest followed under the impulse of divine grace: the innocent life, the acquisition of wisdom, the unflinching acceptance of hardship and an agonizing death which won for him, alone among all our Dominican saints, the triple aureola of the virgin, the doctor, and the martyr.

St. Peter's vocation is our vocation. His life is proposed as a model of our own. We are not all called to be martyrs; but we must surely share the spirit of the martyr if we are to be faithful to our vocation. In the letter that Pope Innocent IV, a few days after learning of St. Peter's death, sent to our brethren gathered in Chapter at Bologna, he said that the sad event should not unduly depress them as though it were an unmixed evil; it should rather be an incentive to take heart and to be of good courage. He implied that to die for the faith is expected of men who have been called to be "champions of the faith and true lights of the world."

Very Rev. Peter R. O'Brien, O.P.

VESSEL OF ELECTION

IN THE LIVES OF ST. DOMINIC which we possess it is frequently affirmed that, of all the books of Sacred Scripture, two especially appealed to his apostolic spirit. St. Matthew's Gospel found his sympathies in its particular stress upon the Messianic character of Christ's mission, that is, to spread abroad the "good news" of the Kingdom of Heaven.

The other was the Epistles of the Apostle of the Gentiles. In the following Prologue[1] with which St. Thomas introduces his study of St. Paul's writings those elements in the Pauline doctrine which most vividly attracted St. Dominic find beautiful expression. St. Thomas, faithful son of his spiritual father, seeks in St. Paul the ideal of the Dominican life, thereby pointing out to all his brothers the unexcelled example of the preacher, teacher, apostle, and "other Christ."

We have tried to reproduce in some way the spirit of St. Thomas' tribute to St. Paul without destroying the forcefulness of his style, or adhering too slavishly to the Latin idiom.

Prologue

> He is to me a chosen vessel to carry my name before the Gentiles, and kings, as well as the sons of Israel.[2]

There are four ways by which we find men compared to vessels in Sacred Scripture: according to what they are made of, with what they are filled, for what use they are meant, and their value.

First, we consider of what vessels are made; a vessel is subject to the will of its maker. "The potter (having broken one vase), as the whim took him, turned it into another thing of clay."[3] So also the composition of men is subject to the will of God, of whom the Psalmist has said: "We did not make ourselves, it was He that made us." And Isaias declares: "Shall the clay dare ask the potter who moulds it: What ails thee?" Paul himself inquires: "Shall the thing fashioned say to its fashioner, 'Why didst thou make me thus?'" Therefore it is according to the will of God the Creator that there should be found a variety in the constitution of vessels. "In a large house there are not only vessels of gold and silver but also of wood and of earthenware."

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[1] St. Thomas, *Expositio in Omnes Sancti Pauli Epistolas,* (Parmae, Vol. XIII, *Opera Omnia:* Typ. Petri Fiaccadori, 1862).

[2] Acts 9: 15. We have used generally the Knox translation of the Bible except in those passages which seemed to demand a more liberal rendition.

[3] References to the sources of St. Thomas' scriptural quotations and allusions have been deliberately suppressed in this translation. They may be found in the edition of the original.

That St. Paul was a "chosen vessel" is borne out by the fact that he was "as a massive vessel of gold, adorned with every precious stone." He was a vessel "of gold" because of the splendor of his wisdom, of which it is said: "And the gold of that land is very good," since "it is more rare than all things else." St. Peter bears witness to this: "So our dear brother Paul also, according to the wisdom granted him, wrote to you."

Paul was a "massive" vessel in virtue of his charity. "Not death itself is so strong as love." The Apostle himself declares: "I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things future, nor height, nor depth, nor any other created object, shall be able to separate us from the love of God."

He was "adorned with every precious stone," that is to say, with all the virtues. "Now whether one builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious marbles, or wood, hay, stubble, the work of each shall become manifest." "For our ground of glorying is this (and it is the testimony of our conscience) that, with holiness and God-given sincerity — not with human cunning, but with divine grace — we have comported ourselves in the world."

Paul, indeed, was such a vessel insofar as he taught the mysteries of the sublime divinity which is proper to wisdom. "Yet among the mature we do speak a wisdom . . . we utter a divine wisdom." He extolled the virtue of charity most vividly. "If I spoke the languages of men and of angels, but had not love, I should sound as a blaring trumpet, or a clashing cymbal." He instructed his hearers in the life of virtue. "Put on, therefore, as chosen ones of God, holy and beloved, a heart of compassion, kindliness, humility, mildness, long-suffering."

Secondly, as to their contents, it pertains to vessels to be filled with some liquid. "They began holding out the jars for her, while she filled them." There are many things with which vessels might be filled; for some hold wine, some oil, and still others a variety of liquids. By divine benevolence men are filled with a variety of graces. "For to one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another faith by the same Spirit . . . But the one and the same Spirit effects all these."

The vessel (Paul) of which we are speaking here was full of precious liquor — full of the name of Christ. "Thy name is as oil poured out." Paul was chosen to "carry" that name to the Gentiles. He was filled to overflowing with that name. "And I will inscribe upon him the name of my God." He possessed this name in the knowledge of his intellect. "I determined to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and Him crucified." He possessed this name in the love of his heart. "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" "If any one loves not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema."

And above all else he possessed the name of Christ in every action of his life. "I live — yet no longer I, but Christ lives in me."

Thirdly, as to the use for which vessels are meant, we consider the fact that some are intended for a more honorable, others for a more humble service. "Has not the potter power over his clay to make from the same mass one vessel for elegance, and another to serve a mean purpose?" Men, too, in accord with the divine plan, are destined for different services. "So it is that all men are built of the same clay; son of Adam is son of earth; yet the Lord, in the plenitude of his wisdom, has marked them off from one another, not giving the same destiny to each. There are those he has blessed with high station; there are those he has set apart and claimed for himself; there are those he has put under a ban and turned them into humble folk, or degraded them from their former distinction."

St. Paul, the vessel of election, was destined for a sublime service inasmuch as he was to be the bearer of the divine name. This name had to be "borne" (by a human agent), since it was so far above mere men. "Behold the name of the Lord comes from afar." So distant because of our sins. "Salvation is far from sinners." But it is also distant from us on account of the darkness of our intellects. "I shall see him, but not now; I shall behold him, but not near." As the angels carry the divine revelations to us who are far from God, so the Apostles bear the Gospel's teachings to us who are far from Christ. Furthermore, just as in the Old Testament we read the Law of Moses, and then the Prophets, who gave the meaning of the law to the people ("Remember the law of Moses, my servant."); so also in the New Testament we read the Gospels, and then the teachings of the Apostles, who passed on to the faithful what they themselves had heard from the Lord. "For I received from the Lord what I delivered also to you."

St. Paul "'bore" the name of Christ in three ways. First, in his body by imitating Christ's way of life and his passion. "For I bear on my body the brand-marks of Jesus." Secondly, by word of mouth, which is evident from the frequency with which he uses the name of Christ in his epistles. "For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks." He can be symbolized by the dove, which came to the ark bearing an olive branch in its mouth. Since the olive signifies mercy, the olive branch is fittingly symbolic of the name of Christ. "Thou shalt call his name Jesus; for he shall save his people from their sins." The dove took the living and growing branch to the ark — the Church — demonstrating its power and meaning by showing forth the grace and mercy of Christ. "And yet, I obtained mercy for this reason, that Jesus Christ might display in me, as a foremost sinner, his universal patience." Accordingly, of all the books of Scripture, the Church makes frequent use in the Old Testament of the Psalms of David, who received pardon for his sins, and in the New Testament of the Epistles of St. Paul, who had obtained mercy, in order that sinners might be strengthened in hope. (However, this is not the only reason, since in the Scriptures almost all of the doctrines of theology are contained.)

The third way in which St. Paul bore the name of Christ was in giving writings of his own to those living and to those yet to come. "Take a great scroll, and write on it, in thy human penmanship."

The excellence of this office of carrying the name of Christ ("to Gentiles, and kings, as well as the sons of Israel") is shown in three ways. First, by the grace of election. "He chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world." Secondly, by his faithfulness, whereby he sought nothing for himself, but all for Christ. "For it is not ourselves that we preach, but Christ Jesus as Lord, and ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake." Thirdly, by his outstanding virtue. "I have toiled much more than all they – yet not I myself, but the grace of God that is in me." Thus Paul as a vessel of election is chosen before the others.

Fourthly, with regard to their value, some people are like useless vessels either because of sin or of error. "He hath made me as an empty vessel." But St. Paul was free of sin and error, so that he is truly a useful vessel. "If therefore a man purifies himself from these (sins and errors), he shall be a vessel for honorable use, sanctified and serviceable for the Lord."

St. Paul's usefulness lies in the fact that he was to bear the name of Christ "before the Gentiles," of whom he was the great teacher. "The teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth." He was to bear that name before "kings," to whom he announced the faith of Christ – to Agrippa, to Nero and his princes. "I want you to know that my experiences have turned out rather for the advancement of the Gospel. To the whole praetorian guard, and to all the rest it has become clear that my captivity is for the sake of Christ." "Kings, when they see this, shall rise up from their thrones, princes too, and fall down to worship in honor of the lord." And before the "'sons of Israel" Paul was to proclaim the name of Christ, to dispute at length with them about Christ. "But Saul grew more and more energetic, and confounded the Jews who lived in Damascus, proving that this is the Christ."

We now know the four causes of these epistles of St. Paul which we are considering. We have the author – likened to a vessel; we have the matter, consisting in the name of Christ, which is the fullness of the vessel – for Christ is the entire doctrine. We have the form – the method of bearing that name – for this doctrine is taught by means of epistles, which were usually carried by messengers. "And the messengers went with letters by the command of the king." We have the division of these epistles according to their purpose or usefulness. Paul wrote fourteen epistles: nine instruct the church of the Gentiles; four, the prelates and princes of the church, or the kings; and one to the people of Israel – the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The epistles contain the whole doctrine of the grace of Christ, which can be considered under a threefold aspect. First, as grace is in the Head — Christ; St. Paul treats of this in the Hebrews. Secondly, as grace is in the more prominent members of the Mystical Body; this is the subject of the epistles to the prelates (Timothy, Titus and Philemon). Thirdly, as grace is in the Mystical Body, which is the Church; we find this in the epistles to the Gentiles, and especially to the Romans.

The grace of Christ in itself can be considered in three ways. First, the nature of grace itself (secundum se), to which St. Paul gives his attention in the epistle to the Romans. Secondly, as grace is in the sacraments, to which the two epistles to the Corinthians are devoted. In the First he treats of the sacraments themselves; and in the Second, of the worthiness of the ministers of the sacraments. Moreover, in the epistle to the Galatians, he excludes any superfluity of sacraments, and in this way rebukes those who would unite the sacraments of the old law to that of the new. Thirdly, as the grace of Christ brings about unity in the Church. In the epistle to the Ephesians he considers the establishment of church unity; in the Philippians he treats of its strengthening and progress; in the Colossians he defends it against error; finally, in the First Thessalonians he defends church unity against contemporary persecutions, and in the Second against future trials, especially in the time of Antichrist.

Paul also taught the spiritual and temporal rulers of the churches. In the First Epistle to Timothy he instructed the spiritual prelates concerning the establishment and government of Church unity; and in the Second concerning firmness in the face of persecutors. To Titus he made clear the best defense against the heretics.

Finally, St. Paul instructed the temporal lords in his epistle to Philemon. And so, in the light of these considerations, the division and order of the Pauline epistles becomes perfectly clear.

Alphonsus Mainelli, O.P.
Translator

CREATIVE THINKING

"**IN THE BEGINNING** God created Heaven and earth . . . And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him . . ."[1]

And when Almighty God created man He did not stop short in His generosity, but He imparted analogously to man His own Divine right of creation — analogously, for man does not create *ex nihilo sui et subjecti,* but only *ex nihilo sui.*

Creative Mind! What a spell of phantasy those words weave over the intellects of many of our modern philosophers. They stand in awe before the concept of man approaching the powers of God. They lose themselves in trying to explain this marvelous power of intellect. Gestalt Theory, Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis, and many other modern theories spread their wings and take flight only to plunge Icarus-like into the *mare caeruleum* of intellectual disaster. For the wax of half-truths was never meant to hold up under the heat of the sunlight of reality.

C. E. Spearman, professor of Psychology at the University of London, has given us the real solution to the whole problem, though he deduces many wrong conclusions from his experience, for instance, ending up in Idealism in his Epistemology. He says:

> Creative Mind! These are big words. Rendered into the Greek language they become *'Nous Poetikos'*, that great mystery conceived by Aristotle. The passive mind, he writes, is potentially all things; but the creative mind is that which converts the potential things into the actual things, as light turns potential color into actual color.[2]

St. Thomas, following Aristotle, used this comparison of light. In his *Commentary on the De Anima* of Aristotle, he shows that the etymological derivation of 'phantasy' is from the Greek 'phos' which means light, and is connected psychically with vision.[3]

We must distinguish at the outset between Creative Thinking and Reproductive Thinking, or between Creative Imagination and Reproductive Imagination. St. Thomas says of the former type of imagination:

> The phantasy, or which is the same thing, the imagination, is ordered to the conservation and retention of these (sensible) forms; for the phantasy, or the imagination, is as it were a certain treasury of forms received through the senses.[4]

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[1] Genesis 1:1, 27.

[2] C. Spearman, *Creative Mind (*London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 1.

[3] St. Thomas, *In De Anima,* (Turin: Marietti, 1948), III, vi, n. 668.

[4] "Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt: est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum." (St. Thomas, *Summa Theolagiae,* [ed. leonina, vol. V, *Opera Omnia,* Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1889], I, q. 78, a. 4.)

This faculty is confined to material sense impressions. It is an automatic file which places the required image before our consciousness at the excitation of a word, place, or some connected association. The imagination of which we speak is much more than this. It calls into play definite intellectual operations. It creates, in the analogous sense of the word. We do not mean to infer that it is a purely intellectual operation, for it is not. Its images are neither pure intellectual forms, nor pure sense representations. The imagination of which we speak combines the intellectual and sense images and fuses them into a unified whole. This type of imagination is seen chiefly in the aesthetic and scientific fields. The former is the creative genius of the artist; the latter is that of the inventor.

To creative imagination are due necessary effort, a definite purpose, attention, and selection. We can combine images to form new ones of which we have had no previous experience. It is well to note, however, that we always work with images which we have actually experienced, and which are the potential elements of the new whole. Watch a boy's face as you tell him a story of pirate-adventure. Recall, yourself, what you experienced when you heard a gripping drama enacted over the radio. There is a real experience of creative imagination.

It would seem that the difference between aesthetic and scientific creative thinking consists in a difference of motivation. The artist is purely selfless; he creates because he feels moved irresistibly to do so; he acts more upon inspiration than on any definite pragmatical reasons. Hence, we find artists devoting themselves to the prosecution of their particular genius at tremendous cost to self. Mozart led a very unhappy life. Beethoven denied himself the happiness of married life for his art. Van Gogh had penury as his constant companion.

Scientific creative thinking is brought to bear more in the service of definite problems. There is a definite obstacle to be overcome, or a definite problem to be solved, and the inventor sets himself to the task. He sets up an anticipating idea or schema in his imagination. Then by a series of comparisons with practical, serviceable examples or images, an apprehension of their relation is concretely grasped. If it solves the task, the inventor's labor is crowned with success; if not, he must proceed again in the same manner.

It is a rather common observation of modern psychologists that there are four different possible sets of circumstances in bringing together the means and the goal. First, both goal and means can be present and recognized in the thinker's consciousness. Secondly, if the goal is given, and the means to attain it is not recognized, the memory recalls complexes of images and tests them individually. Thirdly, if our memory fails in presenting useable images, chance can come to our aid in solving the problem. Fourthly, the end and the means may be offered to our minds accidentally, not as something for which we have striven.

Lowes, describing Newton's observation of the falling apple, remarks:

> The leap of the imagination, in a garden at Woolsthorpe on a day in 1665, from the fall of an apple to an archetectonic conception cosmic in its scope and grandeur is one of the dramatic moments in the history of thought. But in that pregnant moment there flashed together the profound and daring observations and conjectures of a long period of years; and upon the instant of illumination followed other years of rigorous and protracted labour, before the *Principia* appeared.[5]

Edison once said that "genius is one per cent inspiration and ninety-nine per cent perspiration."

We stated in the beginning of this article that the creative mind is that which converts the potential things into the actual things. What do we mean by potential things?

The potential element of creative activity is the raw-stuff presented by the subconscious and conscious mind. The former is a store-house containing latent treasures of a man's past experience. Thoughts, words, deeds, instincts, sentiments, — all are stored away as an amorphous mass capable of being called up into consciousness by the memory, reflected upon, and fashioned into new associations with new meanings. Thus, in creating, a man will necessarily tap the resources of this rich potential which is limited only by the capacity of the individual who possesses it.

When Beethoven sat watching the filtering stream of moonlight playing through the casement, immediately the haunting melodies of his "Moonlight Sonata" were rippling down the stream of his creative imagination. Fra Angelico would have turned to his palette had the same set of circumstances struck him, and we would possess today one more of his immortal paintings. Homer, or Virgil, or Dante, or Shakespeare, would have caught and dammed the water's flow with written words, and produced a new inspiration to lift the hearts of all posterity.

The actualization of the potency of the previous consciousness, therefore, results in the new creation of the intellect. This is nothing more than the actuating of the previously disposed matter by the new form which the creative mind of the artist has conceived. Lowes, in another passage, illustrates this whole process admirably.

> 'The imagination,' said Coleridge once, . . . 'sees all things in one.' It sees the Free Life — the endless flux of the unfathomed sea of facts and images — but it sees also the controlling Form. And when it acts on what it sees, through the long patience of the will the flux itself is transformed and fixed in the clarity of a realized design. For there enter into imaginative creation three factors which reciprocally interplay: the Well, and the Vision, and the Will. Without the Vision, the chaos of elements remains a chaos, and the Form sleeps forever in the vast chambers of unborn designs. Yet in that chaos only could creative Vision ever see this Form. Nor without the cooperant Will, obedient to the Vision, may the pattern perceived in the huddle attain objective reality. Yet manifold though the ways of the creative faculty may be, the upshot is one: from the empire of chaos a new tract of cosmos has been retrieved; a nebula has been compacted — it may be! — into a star.[6]

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[5] John Livingstone Lowes, *The Road to Xanadu* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), p. 433.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

The storing of the Well, the Vision, and the action of the Will are the three requisites of creative thought. The storing of the Well takes place automatically in a man; five crystal clear jets are unceasingly plashing in, increasing the precious supply of water. He must purify those streams, however, by striving constantly to notice more deeply and attain more fully the Being of everything his senses relay into his consciousness.

The Vision consists essentially in perceiving a new relation; this would be combining the potential elements of the previous consciousness into a new and previously unperceived form.

One of the most important factors in creative thinking is that of Will. Without its driving impulse ever spurring the intellect on to new activity, to higher synthesis, to closer unity, there would be no new creations of thought. The fact that it is a basic principle of this complex process is evident from the intense personal interest which is manifest in the production of the object, from the jubilant exhilaration or the despondent depression consequent upon the success or failure of the work.

The resolution to observe an object, then, is the begining of creative activity. It is also definitely convertible into terms of problem solving. For in very many instances, if there were no problem, a man would not be stirred out of his customary complacency. During the period of war, for instance, the mercury of creative activity skyrockets to a feverish point. I think that one must concede, however, that this supercharged activity finds its place mainly in scientific creative thinking; for the fine arts are sold for a mess of pottage in the cataclysm of war.

Creative mind of man lies close to the heart of two real problems which we have on our hands in this modern world. The one is in the field of industry, the other in the field of education. Ultimately, both could be resolved into one, namely, the latter, but let us leave them as they are and adumbrate their outlines and solution a little more clearly.

The roots of practically all of the difficulties we have to face today are sunk deep in the stark materialistic milieu into which we have been plunged. Science has been glorified; philosophy, instead of directing modern scientific investigation by presenting the ultimate causes towards which the inquiry into the proximate causes of being must be directed, has accepted all too often scientific investigation as ultimately true; as a consequence, modern philosophy has contemptuously spurned metaphysics and cast it forth into the exterior darkness of intellectual endeavor. Hence, the attitude of modern philosophers to despise any spiritual being and grant reality only to matter—to being which they can single out with one of their five senses. This pernicious attitude has led to many false conclusions.

Man imitates his Creator in a special way through the unique powers of creative thinking. Here he does not simply use or discover that which already exists, but through the spiritual operation of his intellect he makes or creates new things which did not exist as such before. Man is not fully man if he is inhibited in the use of this right. Now since these new beings which he causes to exist are the result of a spiritual, intellectual activity on his part, he must be reduced to a plane less than human if he is unjustly kept from creative activity. This is the case with many men in modern Industrialism. Though vast improvement has been inaugurated, the ideal is far from being realized. Call to mind the share-croppers of the South; or again, consider the human cogs in the wheels of great manufacturing plants where all a man does is twist a bolt a certain way (which, incidentally, a precise machine could do more efficiently) with no opportunity for the application of intellectual operations to his work. As Eric Gill put it: "The factory 'hand' as such is less than a man — he is simply a sentient part of the machinery. He is only a man when he is not working."[7]

One could, if he so desired, glue his eye to his microscope. He could rigorously acclaim his faith in the reality of matter, and smirk his ridicule at the idea of formal and final causes. He could subject all reality to experimental, three-dimensional research, causing him to strike deeper roots in his gross materialism, accepting only efficient and material causes (if he would accept any causes at all). He could do all this, if he would wish to deny the reality of God's universe in general, and man's nature in particular. He could even try to reduce man's creative power to instinct, a mere animal operation. In all this program he would be in step with every modern Materialist, with every one who would make man a highly integrated form of machine. But he would be out of step with being as it actually exists. Creative power in man is not reducible to instinct or purely material causes. Instinct we share with the brutes; but did anyone ever see a creative work — a painting of a luscious banana, let us say — by any one of the thousands of chimpanzees in our zoos?

Man was not made for bread alone; the life of the senses is not his highest goal. He must be given opportunity to create his own life in accordance with the life of his Divine Master. He must be able to order and unify his life by basing it on the reality of his own nature with all that his nature implies in itself and in its relation to the plenitude of being which surrounds him. All this he must be able to do in order to actuate the richness of his being as man and have the satisfaction of existing as a man not merely a machine.

If one would ask a Catholic educator why he devotes his life to the education of youth, the answer could be summed up in some thought like the following: To mould men after the model of the Man-God, and thus form them to serve their fellowman, their country, and their God.

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[7] Eric Gill, "The Value of the Creative Faculty in Man," *The American Review,* VI (November, 1935).

Before we discuss the problem on education, let us examine a few ideas on intuition in creative thinking. Intuition is a much mooted (or, booted, whichever you like) term, trailing a long series of contradictory meanings from Kant to Bergson. Hence, it will be necessary to define its meaning at the outset.

We understand by intuition in general a form of knowledge distinguished from all others by reason of its objective origin. It is not the result of an intellectual elaboration, of a process of reasoning which leads to a conclusion. Rather, it is imposed by the immediate presence to the mind of a particular object. For certain intuitions a lengthy preparation, a previous elaboration, may be indispensable; but this is nothing more than a prerequisite, a disposition of the knowing subject, necessary for the object to impress itself on his intuition. When the intuition takes place, the object is not perceived as a conclusion is perceived in its premises which are its guarantee. Instead it is perceived of itself, shedding light upon and giving meaning to what has preceded it.[8]

This is nothing more than a new form informing the potency of the previous consciousness; this is "educing a new relation" out of the potential elements stored in the subconscious mind.

The fact that creative thinking and action is intuitive in its nature is not simply a postulate. It is the universal experience of man. The inspired inhabitants of Parnassus' lofty crest have told us so all during the course of man's history. We have all experienced it in our own less inspired way. Take writing for example. We have an end to accomplish; we set about gathering ideas. We mull them over for a long time, allowing them to saturate and mature in our mind. This is the dull period of preparation, of incubation. Then like a flash of light we suddenly perceive the mass in a unified whole; we feel urged to write, to set forth our ideas; if we are deeply moved, we cannot wait to unburden ourselves. The pen will not move quickly enough over the paper. We are afraid lest we shall lose one iota of the unity as it stands before our mind's eye. We are experiencing an intuition of creative thinking.

Fr. de Munnynck expresses this intuition admirably. He says:

> Everyone at some time or another gets a new idea, a new image, which is not the fruit of reasoning, something which is offered brusquely to the attention of the mind. In spite of this phenomenon not everyone contributes to the scientific or esthetic progress of culture. These new ideas or images can have been acquired long since by other minds; they can be trite, even stupid. Yet by them genius reaches its fruitful creations — creations that seem to have been given gratuitously in a sudden illumination.
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> It is obvious that inspiration is not without some source. Often there is a long and apparently sterile period of labor; and then, quite suddenly, a new idea springs into being. The solution of a problem which has long tormented the mind is seen quite clearly. There is granted a sudden insight into the work of art which will reveal the creative genius of the artist. The origin of this new intellectual departure, esthetic or practical,

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[8] M. de Munnynck, O.P., "Notes on Intuition," *The Thomist,* I (July, 1939), p. 145.

> appeared indeed so mysterious to the ancients that Plato could find a sufficient reason for it only in the intervention of a demon or a god; and such words as 'inspirations,' 'genius,' still bear the mark of this supernatural origin. The theory of the 'subconscious' has, however, more or less stripped the robe of mystery from the phenomenon. All the impressions, all the images spontaneously acquired or consciously elaborated, all the judgments which we have formed seem to be preserved forever in the obscure substratum of our soul. There they remain, active, living, combining and separating into original structures. Whenever one of these combinations reaches maturity, it presents itself before the eyes of our consciousness and we are said to have had an 'inspiration' more or less fruitful or fallacious as the case may be.[9]

The emergence of this inspiration from the subconscious remains truly mysterious. We endeavor to explain it by associations, and yet, though these undoubtedly play a large part in its formation, they fall short of a complete explanation. Why are some people seemingly so stupid when it comes to inspirations, while men of genius are constantly being intellectually overwhelmed by new and elaborate combinations. Thus far, the complete explanation evades us. Let it suffice for the present to say that in its study not enough consideration has been given to what St. Thomas has to say concerning the action of angels upon men.[10]

Contrary to the trends of modern secular education, education must make it a primary aim to develop students into what we might loosely term contemplatives. In making use of this term, we shall prescind from its supernatural connotation as a form of prayer, and base its meaning on the ontological nature of intellect, which has as its power to reflect upon its own intellectual acts, and to know and reflect upon the acts of the person of whom it is a part. In other words, students must be trained to think and reflect on the problems they meet with in their lives, and then, what is most important, to act in accordance with their understanding and knowledge. Developing their potentialities with a view to making them contemplatives means nothing more than training them to put unity into the multiplicity of their lives, or in other words, order— — unified, rational order, into the unorganized experiences of their lives. A very highly developed intellectual operation, by the way, which not nearly enough modern men accomplish.

The ideal set before them should be Christ; they, in turn, will reflect on their human acts as a person, and on the relation between those acts and Christ. Then, and only then, will they unify and order their lives accordingly in the light of right reason. Now, this intellectual habit should be developed until it truly becomes a virtue, a part of the fibre of their character. The result will be a real thinker, for such a man will fall naturally into the habit of often reflecting upon himself and the conditions of every sphere of reality around him. In other words, he will be no stranger to solid thought.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[10] Particularly interesting in this regard is the title of one of his articles, namely: *"Utrum Angelus Possit Immutare Imaginationem Hominis."* Cf., St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 3, a. 3.

This, then, is really contemplation in the Christian sense. The Greeks understood it differently. We fructify our contemplation, or immanent activity, in action. This is the life of the person, not solely of the intellect, not solely of the will; thus it is that in education the whole man must be educated, not merely parts of him.

Jacques Maritain has summed up this thought very beautifully:

> We have arrived here at a fundamental truth: Christian philosophy is a philosophy of being; more than that, a philosophy of the superabundance of being; and in this it stands incomparably higher than other great philosophies of being, such as Hindu metaphysics, where being does not give being and can but absorb in itself — maya and soul itself. Christian philosophy, better than the Greek, has seen that it is natural that immanent activity should superabound, since it is super-existing. Purely transitive activity is egoistic, as I have said at the begining of this chapter. Immanent activity is 'generous,' because, striving to be achieved in love, it strives to achieve the good of other men, disinterestedly, gratuitously, as a gift . . . When contemplation superabounds in effacacious love and in action, it corresponds within us to that divine superabundance communicative of its own good.[11]

When students have been formed in such a way as to cause them to create personal imitations of Jesus Christ out of their own lives, Our Saviour's desire: "That they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou has sent," will have been fulfilled.[12]

Melchior Wyss, O.P.

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[11] Jacques Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 183.

[12] John 17:3.

THE MASTERY OF LANGUAGE

> **"Then the Lord** answered Job out of a whirlwind, and said: Who is this that wrappeth up sentences in unskillful words? Gird up thy loins like a man: I will ask thee, and answer thou me."[1]

"'THIS IS NO textbook affair. In this matter you cannot be taught, but you can be trained. It will be like house-breaking a puppy or teaching a horse tricks; and it must be done in much the same way: hard, punishing, endless repetition to acquire and maintain excellence." Those who did not know the late Father Walter Farrell will look on this startling introduction to a course he was teaching as a tight-lipped challenge from a stern martinet. It was indeed a challenge — a provoking goad to eager minds and hearts. But, Christlike, it was a soft-spoken summons. Extended with humility and understanding, modesty, gentle good humor and penetrating simplicity, the challenge was warm and friendly, a generous invitation to be shown the highroad to abundant harvests in the merciful work of preaching the truth.

Father Farrell was a man of plain words. He refused to camouflage the inherent difficulties of a problem. Two months before his death in November, 1951, the famous Dominican theologian began a task that was long close to his heart, that of directing a course in writing for the Dominican students at the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy at River Forest, Illinois. He was firmly convinced that the best approach to acquiring some degree of mastery of language is by writing; it is a direct means to the skilled use of an instrument essential to the apostle.

But Father Farrell did not conceal the difficulties of acquiring this rewarding skill. Although it is the surest road to the mastery of words, writing is by far the most difficult. He was fully aware of the burden he was placing on his students. Father Farrell had served a long and tedious apprenticeship before being numbered among the masters. He had lived the arduous experience of bringing this art to its perfection. And he was eager to share with others the seeds of this experience. But rather than have the seeds he would sow lie untended in fields his students might quickly abandon, Father Farrell preferred to point out to them beforehand the rocks, the thorns, the sandy soil, lest they soon lose heart at the obstacles and set aside the heavy task he placed before them.

As to the fruit their labors would yield, he was at first silent. There was no need for him to speak; the products of his own mind gave sufficient testimony of the results that were possible to achieve. Father Farrell's writing was stamped with the rare hallmarks of originality, precision, and imagination. But he was not seeking imitators of his own fluid style. He hoped instead to induce his students to acquire habits of self-expression that were living extensions of their own personalities. Only then could their work as preachers and teachers be flexible, personal, flowing, alive.

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[1] Job 38:1.

It is regrettable that with his sudden death this ambitious project came to an unexpected end. In the brief weeks of his initial lectures, however, Father Farrell emphasized vigorously the points he intended to strike home. It would be his main objective to induce his students to jettison the deep-rooted tendency of relying on other minds to supply the whetstone for their precisely polished expressions. Like a surgeon who wastes no time in exposing a diseased organ, clearing away all excess tissue as swiftly as his skill allows, Father Farrell was quick to reveal the major source of trouble for those seeking some mastery of language: lack of originality. The elimination of this killing defect was the principal aim of his course in writing.

It was also his intention to indicate the risks and difficulties of being original, to explain the virtues essential to original thinkers, and to indicate the role of learning, sense perception, and unremitting practice in the actual process of original thinking.

Father Farrell made notes of these points and a detailed sketch of his plan for treating them. His concise blueprint served as the accurate master-plan for this paper. Without the touch of his sure fingers to give his ideas living expression, the paper will seem rather threadbare. But if little more than a skeleton, it follows closely the well-laid plans of his project; it presents most of his original material and lacks only the magnificently expressive wardrobe with which he alone could clothe his stimulating ideas.

The late Archbishop Gillet, ex-Master General of the Order of Preachers, once said: "The worst preachers in our churches are of two kinds; those who preach in such a way that they are not understood, since they reel off to their hearers the language of the classroom . . . which is completely unintelligible to their listeners; and secondly the verbose who for good or ill, . . . speak in order to say nothing in sermons which never seem to end, and are filled with empty words and pretentious nonsense."

Father Farrell was aware of the truth of this statement. He gave apt and appalling examples of the four most common failings in the pulpit.

A preacher may have a voice like an organ, yet have absolutely nothing to say and no adequate vocabulary to brighten up his empty ramblings. Father Farrell humorously suggested that such a speaker might possibly hum a few tunes from the pulpit. Or a preacher may have much of importance to say, yet lack the command of language to express his thought accurately. These unfortunate preachers keep repeating the same paltry words over and over hoping they will mean different things. On the other hand, the preacher may have no voice with which to communicate his beautifully worded ideas. His sermons become friendly little chats with the first few rows of his audience. Perhaps the most tragic of all, however, is the preacher with nothing to say, although he possesses a splendid voice and a fine command of language. He is most to be pitied, because he can easily fool himself into thinking that he is a great preacher.

Father Farrell knew that eventually every one of his students would be preaching. He was aware that they would one day be confronted with similar obstacles to success in the apostolate. For this reason the remote aim of his course was sermon writing. The ideals of effectiveness, excellence, and success in the pulpit should guide his students during their formative years in preparation for the priesthood. They should keep this goal in mind constantly; though at the outset there must be no question of writing sermons, indeed there could not be for some years — until such time as they had some knowledge of theology.

The proximate aim of Father Farrell's course in the mastery of language was a consideration of speaking and writing in general. Those who train young men for work in the apostolic ministry can be sure that their students will acquire a knowledge of theology—a knowledge of God capable of being shared. That knowledge can be communicated to them by others during their student years. But teachers of theology cannot be sure that their students will acquire the mastery of voice and language to carry that all-important knowledge to others. Father Farrell was certain that by the time they had finished their theological studies his students would have plenty to say. The difficulty would come with the instruments for getting it said. For this reason he intended to consider the instruments of the preacher and their development as essential means to success in the work of preaching the word of God.

The more mastery a preacher has of his voice and his vocabulary the greater are his potentialities for success in the apostolic ministry. Voice and use of words are the instruments of his apostolate. Yet neither can be given him by the most opulent benefactor. Neither can actually be taught; nor can either be communicated as knowledge can. For such mastery is accomplished only by doing, by experiment and experience on the part of the preacher.

The reason for this is abundantly clear: these two instruments are practical arts. They are not to be mastered by theoretical study, but by actual doing. In the matter of their development by the student the professor is limited. He can expose the theory by showing how to pitch the voice or how to vary tones; he can indicate how to express an idea or how badly one has been expressed. The student observes how the teacher does it. He sees why this or that is wrong. But in reality the teacher's words will have little meaning and no effect until the student has done the thing himself.

It is hardly necessary to add that the personal achievement of the mastery of voice and language must be regarded solely as the development of instruments that will insure the successful communication of truth to others. The development of voice and language should parallel the study and contemplation necessary for the apostolic work of preaching, if the message of truth is not to fail through lack of proper instruments. Never must the development of the instruments be over-emphasized to the detriment of doctrinal excellence; never must mastery of the instruments become an end in itself.

Although his course had a necessary reference to eloquence, Father Farrell was not immediately concerned with the development of the voice. Of the two instruments of preaching, the voice is the easier to master. Its development is a practical art that readily affords opportunities for constant practice. Once set on the right path, the student seeking to improve his voice can work privately to acquire the desired mastery. It is the easier art, because in its development the student seeks to imitate the good speaking habits of the expert. In addition, there is no obstacle of originality in developing the voice. Indeed there is no place for originality in the use of this instrument; any departure from the standard norms of good speaking invariably results in a drastic reduction of the effectiveness of a preacher's work.

Far more difficult to acquire is the art of using language well, the mastery of the tools of expression. And far less effective than the poor speaker is the preacher who lacks originality in the use of this art. It was Father Farrell's plan to show the absolute need for originality in the mastery of an instrument so essential to success in the apostolate, and to concentrate on the best means to build up in his students rewarding habits of self-expression stemming from the habit of originality.

The Great Reluctance

The apostle's labors are fourfold: preaching, writing, study, and prayer. It cannot be overemphasized how these four pillars of the successful apostolate demand incessant effort and perseverance on the part of the preacher. These four offices require specialized methods which are means to rational habits that exclude any mechanical procedure. Without this effort and method, standards of excellence disintegrate, and good habits are replaced by those resulting in the dull, heavy expression of hollow, pompous thought.

A sermon which costs little in the making costs a great deal in the hearing. Without order and clarity a sermon fails in its purpose of enlightenment; and without mastery of the tools of expression there can be no order and clarity in its composition. Writing is the best means to this mastery, yet at the present time there is a great reluctance to write. The results of this unwillingness are unfortunate. There is an alarming lack of good writing, an increased imitation of bad writing, and a greater tendency to empty, artificial ramblings on the part of poorly trained speakers.

Father Farrell hastened to explain the reasons for this aversion to putting thoughts into words and putting both on paper. There is exhaustive effort in the work of writing, and shallow rewards for the one producing it. To underscore these two facts Father Farrell compared all four offices of the apostolate from the standpoint of the effort each requires and the rewards each receives.

The labor of the successful preacher is unquestioned. His success depends upon long, careful preparation of the matter of his sermons coupled with the constant development of his memory. Both of these commodities insure a living message that is certain to enlighten and inspire his hearers. Both are the result of very great effort. Further effort is required of him at the time of delivering the sermon. This often results in a mysterious exhaustion, the very work of preaching seemingly sapping his strength. Father Farrell cited an example of such exhaustion in the life of Our Lord when He and the disciples were crossing the Sea of Galilee. Jesus, Who was a carpenter not a sailor, curled up on a cushion in the stern of the boat and promptly fell asleep. As every preacher knows, He had well earned that sleep, for to bring wisdom to men the master must give something of himself as well as all of the truth.

But that is not all. A preacher's sincere efforts are invariably short-lived. This is not a question of his intensity, but of his spirits. The work of preaching depends upon the fickle human will; at any time a lack of spirit may strike at the preacher's habits of preparation and memory. Or, without warning, he will feel a similar lack of spirit on the occasion of delivering a sermon. This may prevail week after week, preventing him from speaking well for longer than a very few minutes. And since the intensity of his work is not diminished, this lessening of his spirit multiplies the efforts necessary for continued success in the apostolate.

Study places at the disposal of the apostle an inexhaustible mine of doctrine charged with divine and human reality, with clear and profound ideas about Christ and His Church. Study obliges the preacher to reflection, habituates him to think, to judge, and to reason. But the work of study is not to be compared with either preaching or writing. Until the time when study, in its final stages, becomes a preparation for writing and preaching, it really consists in watching someone else work. These final stages are reached when the fruits of study are put to use by applying principles learned from others; when, having understood another's vision of truth, the student begins to make it his own. But there is one difficulty in study. It is a process that never finishes, because the penetration of truth is an unlimited task. The ever-widening horizon of truth beckons always, and the quest for truth ends only on the shores of the Infinite.

The preacher is also faced with difficulties in prayer. Archbishop Gillet said: "Success in prayer resembles a citadel seen from a distance. It cannot be reached until one has built for oneself, with the use of mortification, the road leading there." Prayer is an activity of the practical intellect consisting essentially in petition. It is not an affair of feeling and sensibility; it is not an exercise of the imagination, nor an outlet for excessive emotionalism. Prayer is the work of reason. It is the human reason stripping itself before God, doing homage to Him by revealing how it wishes to share in the fruits of the Divine Omnipotence. Father Farrell observed that prayer is the biggest thing we can do; it is the one act of ours that is without limitations.

He also pointed out that the work of prayer is closest to that of writing. Like writing, prayer is a purposeful revelation of self, although it reveals what God knows already. Its success depends upon fortitude and perseverance, for prayer is rarely fruitful unless preceded by long, patient effort, hard work that is often slow, and hindered by many obstacles.

The solid norm of good writing, as well as of original style, is the vitality of the writing: it is alive or dead. If it is hacked out word by word in slow agony, of course it is dead; there is nothing of the writer in it. His work then becomes a mosaic or a museum piece on wires, stuffed, and mounted. Such dingy products are grave stumbling blocks to the preacher, for the truths he speaks of will bear fruit on one condition, namely, that he cause the doctrine he has received to undergo a personal transformation, which will strip it of all its technical apparel and render these truths assimilable to his audience.

Like prayer, the work of writing is at first repelling and necessarily prolonged. For this reason the writer must have the virtue of fortitude to attack the work at hand. Fortitude supplies the initial impulse to get down to the task of the personal transformation of doctrine. But the personal stamp is applied to truth only after long, tedious effort; and so the successful writer must have to a high degree the sustaining virtue of perseverance. But even armed with these two virtues, the writer is faced with additional difficulties. Like prayer, the work of writing is seldom as planned. It is slow, inch by inch, which results in strained, stammered effects, ringing of the formula and the artificial. The writer experiences periods of intellectual aridity. And when he is able to give expression to his ideas and sentiments, the results seem to fall far short of what he had intended and expected.

The reluctance to write is in large measure due to the meager rewards that await the sincere efforts of the writer. Of course, not all write for the laurels of success, but we are all human and we depend in large part on encouragement and help from others for any effort expended. To illustrate how paltry are the fruits of writing in the case of one engaged in the apostolic ministry, Father Farrell compared them to the rewards of preaching, study, and prayer.

Although, in the light of the labor that each requires, writing most closely resembles prayer, the results of prayer are God's. To Him belongs the rewards. The prayerful soul reveals to God the plans it desires to see executed; but it recognizes that the execution belongs to Him alone. We know the benefits that redound to the prayerful soul: enlightened, inflamed, and filled, vivified, guided, and strengthened, it stammers thanks to the Source of these supernatural riches. Overwhelmed, by the Divine gifts, consoled, sanctified, transformed in Christ, and finally united in Heaven in the perfect reverberation of God's love, the soul seeks no reward. In the free gift it has received all. This is the infinite lure of prayer; and created rewards pale in comparison to these unmerited gifts. The soul habituated to sincere effort in prayer realizes this, and humbly says: "Blessing and glory and wisdom and thanksgiving and honor and power and strength to our God forever and ever. Amen."

The rewards of study are such as to keep the sincere student at his books for a life time. Father Farrell, himself a lifelong scholar, mentioned the enticement of truth, the rewards of discovery, and the sweetness of wisdom as being the strongest satisfactions to be had from study. The energetic seeker of truth is aware of constant progress in his personal development; his efforts lead to intellectual superiority, the confidence of knowledge possessed. He has the satisfaction of positive command; he realizes he can share his hard-won knowledge without loss to himself.

Accompanying this intellectual growth, dilating the scope of his investigations, is an increased facility to compare and relate. This is an important counterpart of the scholar's intellectual development for it permits an ordering of ideas, an estimation of their true value, an appreciation of their content. This is of the utmost importance from the standpoint of personal satisfaction for it helps the habitual student to rest his judgments, not on appearance, but on reality.

The compensations of preaching are especially tangible and satisfying. In return for often heroic efforts in preparation, memory, and the maintenance of a certain drive, the successful preacher engages in a work that is personally satisfying. Preaching is an exercise of power: the preacher experiences power, superiority, when instructing and counseling the ignorant and the doubtful.

The preacher is inevitably aware of a response from his audience. He is present to see the immediate effects of his sermon. Very often he receives admiring and appreciative comments from his hearers. Father Farrell observed that while personal appreciation by the audience was dangerous fodder for pride, it was nevertheless always sweet to taste. In addition to the immediate effects of his sermon, the preacher often sees more far-reaching results of his work, in the confessional, in conversions and marriages.

Compare these abundant rewards to the treeless plain stretching before the writer. Dry and dusty his work, his recompense is always and immediately intangible. Sharing his success with the poor companionship of a typewriter, the impact of his efforts are quite uncertain beyond the walls of his study. The author seldom meets his readers and rarely hears of the effects of his effort. There is little satisfaction without the knowledge of the exercise of power, without the knowledge of response, of counsel given and action taken. Personally his work is always unsatisfying. It is so much straw, since it never measures up to his visions or plans. For this reason he expects no appreciation from others, and indeed he gets no hint of personal appreciation from anyone. Finally, his efforts are the subject of enduring criticism. What is written is down in black and white; it must be defended, elaborated, explained by the author at all times.

The Habit of Originality

Father Farrell never minimized the need for good writers. But the less ambitious aspirants fall away, dried up, disappointed, defeated from the start; they must have at their command something to overcome the psychological difficulties of their trade, something to erase the paralyzing reluctance to write which these difficulties engender. There must be something that will spark the writer into activity. What is this spark, this all-important catalyst that will spur the machinery of the mind into ever-increasing literary activity? The essential ingredient is the habit of originality. Father Farrell constantly emphasized the necessity of this hard won habit — the indispensable keystone to all successful writing and preaching.

The calipers with which good writing is measured hinge on the vitality of the work produced: it either remains alive and stimulating, or it is dead, miscarried or smothered at the time of delivery. It is evident that writing cannot be any more alive than the person producing it. Father Farrell insisted that it can be at least that alive if it flows directly from the mind and heart of the author. The only means of effecting such a vital flood of expression, responding to the writer's instant command, is through the habit of originality. This, he maintained, is the sole surety that one's writing will be personal, expressive, alive, and clear.

From this point it seems that nothing further could deter the sincere writer. By attaining the subjective mastery of language through the acquisition of the habit of originality, the writer will overcome all difficulties arising from his work. He has in his possession the magic talisman; he cannot but succeed. But here again Father Farrell paused to point out grave risks and difficulties. They stem from originality itself. He mentioned them primarily because they are alleged as good reasons for not writing.

Perhaps the greatest source of danger to continued originality is the need for a vibrant intellectual life in contrast to a completely passive, dragging existence. Father Farrell insisted that truly original work was the result of unusually intense mental activity. As in all moments of great stress this activity was the occasion for excitement, joy, hope, desire. For this reason it must be kept in restraint. If it is the essential spark to effective literary production, then it must be confined to the work of writing and not allowed to disturb other obligations and duties of the writer.

Father Farrell mentioned other difficulties that confront the original writer. The obstacles arising from all that is required to be original in thought and expression, flowing from the very nature of the work, include the fundamental difficulties of all literary production. There is a distaste for beginnings; efforts are long-enduring; out-put is molasses-slow; and accompanying these is an exhaustion that seems to follow upon the intense intellectual activity required. There are also difficulties from man: from the writer himself and from those who read his work with critical eye.

Since original writing, as a determined statement of the truth, is definitely a work of mercy, the original writer must possess the virtues of humility and charity — the stable pillars of mercy. These must firmly pervade his personality to counteract the rise of reckless snobbery that often results from the exercise of mercy. Humility and charity are the very fundamentals of Christian perfection. St. John of the Cross says: "The state of perfection . . . consists in the perfect love of God and contempt of self." Proficiency in these virtues is attained only after long and arduous exercise.

Beyond the hurdles to becoming effectively virtuous, two other obstacles constantly face the original writer: the censor with his unyielding requirements, and the critic with his deflating barbs and impassive disregard for personal feelings. Yet the original writer must always be prepared to meet them; submitting completely to authority, smiling bravely at insults, he must not become discouraged by lack of concern or appreciation for his efforts and results.

The innate risks of originality are not light. As a work of mercy the dangers of originality are common to preaching and writing. From such work there is the continued hazard of self-appreciation. The author manifests a superiority over others by instructing and counseling them. Because his work is original it is in a sense creative. For this reason when the original writer shares the beauty of truth with the ignorant and the doubtful, it is beauty of his own creation. Improper evaluation of this creation may easily lead his mind and heart away from the source of all that is beautiful into the tinsel labyrinth of pride. A further pitfall can be appreciation or lack of it from the writer's fellow-men. The first occasions smug presumption, the second, bitter cynicism or the turmoil of despair.

The possibility of further presumption welded to hypocrisy looms up from the nature of writing itself. Father Farrell maintained that the original writer invariably puts down more than he knows. This is a thrilling consequence of truly original work. But it is so easy for him to pretend that he saw all significances while actually writing and take credit for them afterwards. Or, worse still, snared in vain-glory, he may attribute the mysterious results in his writing to some uncommon excellence in himself.

Father Farrell believed the greatest hazard to originality lay in the possibility of complete moral disintegration on the part of the writer. He often spoke of the mysterious exhaustion following sincerely original effort. He ascribed this to a surprising fact. Because original writing is creative work it is too big for men. This can be explained by examining the nature of creative work. It is an unusual surpassing of the artist's own gifts and those of others. Going beyond the natural talent of the original craftsman, it is a work that is most proper to God.

Thus from the very dimensions of his work the original writer is in danger of being drained intellectually, physically, and morally. Work to be done is looked upon as impossible; work that is finished is considered inadequate. This discouragement easily develops into a state of sadness and even severe melancholy. An unhealthy condition arises prompting the individual to seek pleasurable outlets which, because of the strain on his lower faculties, may become rashly excessive. St. Thomas has said that no one can live for long in sadness without pleasure.

Faced with this maze of risks and difficulties, must the sincere writer or preacher put aside all thought of originality in his work? Father Farrell's answer was: no. There is a way out; but it is not an easy way. A craftsman can be original only in the measure that he is armed and supported by protecting virtues. Only the virtuous can risk the dangers. The truly original man needs a constant double bolstering: of humility to hold pride in check, of the vigor of Christ to counteract personal exhaustion. Without these virtues writer and preacher struggle helplessly in the quicksand of vice. When they are present and operating a balance is maintained, the stability ensuing from all virtue, and both preacher and writer invariably accomplish more than they realize.

We have spoken of the virtues that are necessary to the writer. Fortitude and perseverance for the courage to attack slow beginnings and endure periods of intellectual aridity; humility and charity to counteract rash presumption and pride that often develop from doing works of mercy. But if the writer would be original, he must look to temperance as the wellspring of his art. Temperance is the fundamental operative habit upon which originality will depend, and upon which the truly original writer or preacher must necessarily base his life, if he wishes to avoid becoming a rubber stamp for the ideas of others.

Implied in the name of temperance is a certain moderation or tempering of the natural inclinations not of themselves subject to reason. The scope of temperance is only with things inclined against the rational; moderation, a work of reason, keeps such things in restraint. St. Thomas says that the object of temperance is the moderation of the passions of the concupiscible appetite, most properly the passions seated in the sense of touch — love, joy, desire. Father Farrell called the passions powerful and indispensable means of attaining our ultimate goal, of their very nature designed to obey reason; out of control, they are vicious enemies threatening life and destroying humanity, wrecking all that is beautiful in man.

It is important to note that the role of temperance is moderation, government of human actions and passions, not destruction of pleasures arising from them. Temperance does not fight pleasure; but it does fight all the evil that results when passions go beyond the bounds of reason in pursuit of pleasure. The beauty of man's soul is most easily defaced by the shattering results of passions unrestrained. Passions bridge the gap between man and brute. By the exercise of temperance man is stayed from crossing this gap, this yawning chasm, that leads him to actions on a level with the beasts.

The result is one of beauty. The very essence of beauty is proportion, a marvelous ordering of parts into a brilliant whole. From its very note of moderation, temperance implies the establishment of order, and so of beauty. It is the order established by reason shining through all the actions of man, extending even to the basest things in him. Father Farrell noted the intimate relation between the two — temperance, an acutely personal virtue; beauty, an intensely personal thing. From beauty, the primary attribute of temperance, there is made available for the original writer three essential needs — tranquillity, honesty, and modesty.

We have seen that only the vibrantly active intellect is capable of original expression. Yet the original mind must not look to unrestrained passions to spur it into activity. On the contrary, the passions must be rigidly controlled if the products of the mind are to be clear, well-ordered, and original. The passions are so closely allied to all that man does that their disorder results in an unnatural disturbance of the whole man. Physical processes are disrupted. The intellect gropes and stumbles blindly; the will dallies and balks stubbornly. But with temperance at the helm the required moderation is effected. The house is put in order;

tranquillity of soul is preserved; the efficiency of the intellect increases. It can then grapple with the problems of originality intensely, confidently, completely undisturbed.

But far more important to the original thinker than this tranquillity is the virtue of honesty or spiritual beauty. Beauty is the result of the concurrence of clarity and due proportions. When man's conduct or actions are well proportioned in respect to the spiritual clarity of reason, there is such a concurrence. The result is honesty or a kind of spiritual beauty. From this resplendent clarity and proportion all that man does shines forth brilliantly. The spoken and the written word especially take on new splendor, for they are the external acts reflecting through social intercourse the intelligibly spiritual beauty of man.

Such beauty is attractive and naturally delightful. Attractive, because it is beauty immediately perceived as something wonderful and good; naturally delightful, because man takes pleasure in that which is becoming to him; and spiritual beauty, stemming from actions ordered to reason, is naturally becoming to man. From the note of attractiveness there is an esthetic appreciation implied in the virtue of honesty. It is that very love and appreciation of beauty that makes the acts of temperance more perfect. It is this that stimulates revulsion and shame for the ugliness and distortion of sin, this that supplies abundant inspiration to embrace the beauty for which man was made. From the aspect of natural delight, there is in honesty a reminder that here indeed is a virtue to lead the minds and hearts of others to God through the spiritual beauty they behold in the truly honest man.

Father Farrell considered spiritual beauty in a person as the stamp of the individual soul on all the details of living of this person. Every human soul is unique, different, original in its gifts and activity. It is important to originality that the soul remain completely individual, absorbing nothing foreign to its make-up, affecting nothing that will veil its unique beauty.

The job of preserving this individuality falls to modesty, a virtue ordered to the production and nourishment of spiritual beauty. Modesty and the exact role it plays in our lives are extremely difficult to describe. We know people who are modest, yet we fail to know the reason why. Moderation and restraint are the effects of modesty, yet it is difficult to get at the realities with which modesty deals: the lesser pleasures of reasonable hope, knowledge, sincerity, affability, play and dress. They are in the background of our activity. To be sure, they brighten up our daily pattern of living, but they are of no great importance in the great drama of attaining to eternal life. For this reason the virtue moderating these pleasures is often completely overlooked; and this is particularly true in an age of materialism, unbridled pleasure-seeking, and sophistication.

But this provides no excuse for the original writer to discard the habit of modesty. It is intangible, difficult to see or to describe, unpopular with the age; but for all of that it is no less real, no less essential to original thought and expression. Modesty is the virtue that supplements the work of temperance. Temperance establishes an order of beauty and tranquillity by moderating the passions most difficult to control. Modesty preserves and polishes this order, preventing the distortion of beauty and the disruption of tranquillity occasioned by the subtle dissipations of pride, curiosity, untruthfulness, insolence, discourteous behavior, and the slavish attachment to unreasonable fads and fashions. Modesty is of importance to the original thinker primarily from the standpoint of regulating the desire to know, and the desire to be truthful or sincere. From these two elements Father Farrell fashioned a definition of originality: a definition that is at the same time a guide, an accurate road sign, to all who would be original.

The problem of originality is twofold. There is the need to awaken the individual from an habitual mental infancy wherein he lethargically depends on others to do his thinking for him. Father Farrell hinted that this condition is actually worse than infancy, because here the individual perpetually looks to others to do his feeding and digesting. Secondly, there is the need of rescuing the personality from submersion in a torrent of others' thoughts and expressions.

The virtue of modesty serves to overcome this double problem. By moderating the desire to know, modesty enables the intellect to succeed in three things: to seek truth patiently and accurately through proper channels; to understand clearly the proper uses of this truth; to admit always that the possession of truth must never be an occasion of pride. From the standpoint of originality, the proper channels used in seeking truth are of fundamental importance. One of these channels is the active use of the filter of one's personality to impart a personal, individual slant to all that is learned.

By moderating the outward expression of truth, the second problem of originality is erased. Here modesty permits the original thinker to show himself sincerely and truthfully by word and deed to be such as he is inwardly. It frees him from the penalty of using as his own the ideas and expressions of others; it permits a clean escape from the use of lustreless clichés — the language of echoes.

Having established these preliminary points, Father Farrell defined originality as *modesty of thought and expression.* He regarded personal and original as correlatives. The individual soul is different from all others. For this reason every individual is a different personality, an original creation, never duplicated, never exactly like any other. Modesty of thought insures the inward dispositions toward originality; modesty of expression insures the outward manifestations of this originality. The one enables an original ordering of thought according to the original patterns of individual personality; the other assures the accurate representation of this original material through the written and the spoken word. In his definition of originality Father Farrell wished to convey by the term *modesty* the notion of revelation. Modesty, the heart of originality, is the unveiling of self, the stripping away of the false, the borrowed, the stolen, to reveal the individual beauty of the person. Lack of originality is the hiding of self; it is the concealing of the person, the covering over of the individual with a canopy of elements foreign to his personality. Like all immodesty, this concealment only serves to deface the spiritual beauty of the individual.

Originality and Learning

Having examined in some detail the virtues necessary to original writing, Father Farrell turned his attention to the actual process of original writing. Original writing depends fundamentally on the processes of original thought. Original thought depends in turn on whether methods of learning are both active and passive, and not just passive.

Passive learning is the apprehension of another's vision of truth in such fields as philosophy, theology, and politics; or it may be the acquisition of opinions, facts, or correlations of fact in such fields as history, literature, and the experimental sciences. "Cramming" for examinations, and memorizing a professor's notes for classroom recitation are the outstanding examples of passive learning. Absorbing newspaper opinion or campaign declarations for the formation of personal political views, some literature courses and technical training were cited by Father Farrell as studies almost exclusively passive in their character.

Active learning is something completely different. It presupposes passive learning as its first step; but definitely not as its last step. In active learning, having acquired another's grasp of truth by understanding it completely, the student then begins to make it his own. This is a process that never finishes, because the penetration of truth is an unlimited task.

Active learning may be acomplished in two ways: by proceeding from principles, or by proceeding from situations involving principles. The first method applies only to that formal learning to be had from professors and books; the second is applicable to learning by discovery.

When proceeding from principles, the student must first sift out the universal or enduring kernel from the husk of another's man's experience, imagery, and presentation; or he may take a principle as given, a term as known and clearly stated. He must then pass that core through the filter of his own living — his own imagery, experience, and activity. By doing this he begins to make this learning his own. It is no longer another's concept of truth that he has, but one that is truly his own.

This is the aim of all teaching. When this has been done the student is in a position to give this truth unique, original expression.

The method differs slightly when proceeding from situations. In both cases, however, principles are at work in an authentic fashion. Confronted with a situation to be understood, a human problem to be solved, certain conduct to be evaluated, the student first seeks a source of unifying factors in the situation. These are normally found in general issues such as the truths at stake. He must then draw these factors through the filter of his personality in order to see them at work in fields familiar to him from study and experience. Very often he must try to imagine himself in similar situations. Finally, these factors must be brought back to the original starting point and applied with complete freshness and vigor to the problems arrayed before him. His understanding of the situation will have been improved and refined; his evaluation of the problem will stem from principles the student can apply accurately; his solution of the problem will develop from the personal application of those same principles.

The essence of the process of active learning is contrast. Two terms must be present to the student in order to effect this essential operation. One of the terms of the comparison will always be either a principle or a situation involving principles. This term is the common property of all who wish to investigate it through methods of active learning. The other term of the contrast is of an intensely personal character. This is the personal filter with which principles and situations are contrasted by the original thinker. The personal filter of one's personality is a result of the phantasms by which contrast is possible. With these two elements at work, the filter and the phantasms upon which it depends, a personal slant possible to no one else will always result for the writer in his examination of material. This is because the personal view is drawn from his own experience, by his own phantasms as material for contrast.

The process of active learning is not an automatic affair. It is always a process of thought. Implied in the notion of contrast is the note of comparison, and comparison always suggests that a judgment is made. But the process is not simply one of thought; with the additional element of personal character belonging to one of the terms of the contrast, Father Farrell assured his students that this thought was always productive thought.

Father Farrell spoke of the knowledge his students must have of their subject. For them, as writers and preachers, this will for the most part be a knowledge of God, of man, of Catholic truth and life. It can be obtained only by passive and active learning. It can be imparted to others successfully only if it is an attractive product, original in design. This pattern of originality is obtained by filtering the knowledge of their subject through the psychological means placed at their command.

Man gets truth by comparison and contrast, by judgment and reasoning, by analysis and synthesis. For him to know and speak of a thing it must have parts; or he must talk about it as if it did have parts. He must take things apart and put them together, otherwise he is helpless to speak of them. For this reason the greatest difficulty is presented in the study of the most simple things — being, form, substance. The study of the complex, on the other hand, can be tedious, but there are fewer inherent difficulties in the process.

In addition to this, man is a rational *animal,* composed of *body* as well as soul. Man cannot operate on the purely spiritual level of God and the angels. He cannot use concepts without reference to the imagination. The material for his concepts is ministered by the senses through the imagination. All of his knowledge begins in the senses. For this reason the calibre of the material gathered by the senses and the consequent calibre of the phantasms produced in the imagination greatly determine the quality of man's concepts.

What are the consequences of all this? There is a radical necessity of perfection of the sense receptors and their use to obtain originality in writing. Man is in constant need of material for comparison and contrast. It is essential to his penetration of truth; it is indispensable to the originality of his thinking. The entire process of original thinking will depend ultimately upon the material stored up by the senses, the imagination and the memory. The vividness of the phantasm depends on the clarity of sense impression; there is an equal dependence on the phantasm for thought, illustration, comparison, and contrast. This process will also depend on the use made of the material produced by the senses. If this material is thrown into the dustbin of the mind after being used once or twice, there will soon result an extreme shortage, if not a complete lack, of the very familiar stuff which furnishes the personal elements for the study of principles and situations.

Father Farrell stressed the fact that this material is gathered by living and constantly learning: by discovery and teaching. But both sense experience and imagination must be kept in control. The senses must be trained to great selectivity, for indiscriminate sense knowledge will result in phantasms that are out of focus, of little use to clear thinking. The imagination must be harnessed to prevent its creative faculties from settling into uncontrolled, unproductive day-dreaming where thoughts wander and even soar but without tangible results. The memory, a by-product of alert senses and imagination, must be cultivated and kept in order. The part of memory is that of a storehouse; the provisioning of this storehouse is done by the development of the memory itself, by continued efforts to recall. But experience tells us that mere provisioning is not sufficient for the development of an accurate, dependable memory. Unless these provisions are filed away systematically the storehouse will shortly become a scrap heap, a junk pile where the valuable is lost among the absolutely useless, and where nothing can be found at the time it is needed.

By developing an interest and sympathy for situations, people, and fields of activity, the writer develops an invaluable aid to senses, imagination, and memory. Interest in a thing always tends to improve the knowledge of it. A deeper penetration seems to follow those things which hold man's interest and sympathy. The senses take in more detail, the imagination brings the phantasms into sharper focus, the memory holds on to them tenaciously.

At this point Father Farrell introduced a practical directive for his course in writing, a suggestion that students could well follow all during their student days. He urged them to begin immediately a daily exercise in writing. They were advised to write several paragraphs, if they could not go on to fill a page; never should the time spent on this daily exercise exceed fifteen minutes.

They could write about anything: the rain, the sun, the noise of thunder, the food, the study, the furniture — anything at all. But Father Farrell insisted that they write rapidly, relaxed, tongue in cheek, not trying to turn out copybook essays for a teacher's scrutiny. And when they finished every day they were to throw the exercise into the wastebasket.

There are reasons for this. Father Farrell insisted that such writing be put into the wastebasket, because that is where it belongs; it is undoubtedly not any good. The student's purpose in this daily task would not be to build up something for his files, to be found and published with admiration after his death. His aim would be to build up something within himself, the practical art, the habit of self-expression; that he could not throw into the wastebasket; nor could he find it in any other way than by producing in quantity for that inglorious receptacle.

The wastebasket would save the student from desperate efforts to produce something unusually good, carved, sculptured, or mounted. By writing for it every day the student, by his regularity and quantity production, could acquire the practical art of putting thoughts into words and expressing both clearly on paper. By writing rapidly, the student would make his writing an extension of his powers of speech: with all of the living flexibility of personal conversation.

Father Farrell indicated three ways of thinking originally: by application, by substitution, and by combining analysis and application. These three methods save the writer from the tendency to make his thinking consist merely in remembering what someone else has thought.

In application the writer takes a principle whose terms are understood, and he puts it into a set of human circumstances with which he is familiar. If it is a principle of general application, it applies in this circumstance or situation; if not, the necessary distinctions to be made are more readily apparent.

The result of this application is necessarily original for no one else in the world has this identical familiarity on which to draw. This procedure provides clear penetration of the principle, and it more accurately indicates to the writer its limits and extensions. He is capable of making original comments about it; he knows the uses to which it may be put. Until all of this is done the writer has accomplished only half the job of learning, and really none of the task of writing.

By substitution Father Farrell implied parallelism or juxtaposition. In this procedure the writer takes a situation or event whose full significance he wishes to probe, or which he wishes to grasp more vividly and intimately. To properly evaluate this situation he must put it beside one with which he is completely familiar; or he may replace the characters in the situation with others intimately associated with himself. By doing this he will see the situation in a new light, in the light of his own personality and experience. When speaking or writing of it he will have fresh sources upon which to draw, a fund of personal impressions, considerations, and judgments eagerly sought and appreciated by others.

The third method is a combination of the first two. Here the writer must first abstract the principles involved in a situation, and apply them to situations with which he is familiar. Then he must place the situation itself in a set of circumstances known to him personally. The first step permits a penetration of the principles; the second step allows a better grasp of the situation. As in the first two methods, the result is an intimate understanding of both the principles and the situation.

In conclusion Father Farrell indicates the relative value of active and passive learning to the writer. Neglect of passive learning sharply limits the possibility of active learning. Such disregard tosses overboard the wisdom and labor of both predecessors and contemporaries. Yet the wisdom and learning of others have never been neglected by great men. St. Thomas, St. Albert, all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, constantly examined the opinions of others.

Passive learning has its greatest excellence in fields of the factual. Everyone can do with facts. Father Farrell insisted that all writers should know and memorize them. One of the weaknesses of modern writing, especially here in America, can be attributed to carelessness in this factor of passive learning. Such weakness stamps writing, however mechanically excellent, as ignorant, teeming with inaccuracies, muddled by improper knowledge of the facts. But for all of this, passive learning makes no direct contribution to originality.

The work of passive learning is primarily a work of synthesis or partial synthesis; if it is exclusive of active learning, it is a positive guarantee against originality. Active learning, on the other hand, particularly philosophical and theological study, proceeds on and emphasizes primarily the analytical not the factual. This is the principal characteristic of all scholastic method. It is the chief reason why such studies are rated as so difficult.

Active learning is done by thinkers not memorizers. It is the norm which determines the vitality or decay of intellectual life. Through active learning it is possible to achieve the greatest excellence in the fields of politics, philosophy, and theology. It is inseparable from originality, for active learning results in authentic products fashioned by vigorous minds. Such products are among the most precious commodities of every age. They are precious but not unobtainable. That was the final point that Father Farrell wished to make. Mastery of language is not a futile reaching for the moon; it is a difficult practical art demanding great virtue, deep thought, and incessant practice before any man can call this art his own. But the final result, the end product, overshadows all the difficulties. For what matter the difficulties provided the truth is made known?

Justin Murphy, O.P.

PURPOSIVE BIOLOGY

ONE OF THE MOST fundamental questions facing Thomism today is the problem of its relation to the modern scientific mind. Has Thomism anything to offer to contemporary science?

The purpose of this paper is to answer this question with an affirmative: Thomism is as able to enfold within itself the truths discovered by modern science as it was to enfold within itself the physical data of Aristotle and the ancients.

To prove this, only one phase of modern science will be discussed in this paper. A question which is greatly controverted in modern biology is the problem of teleology: Does final causality exist among living things?

To reach an affirmative answer to this question, the same method as that used by Aristotle, Saint Albert, and Saint Thomas will be followed. Upon a careful analysis it is amazing to see how closely their discussion of final causality in nature coincides with the problems and objections that biologists of the past one hundred years have raised. Therefore, in this paper, the same method will be followed with this one change, that instead of giving only the objections raised and answered by Aristotle and Saint Thomas, the modern errors will be considered.

It may be noted at this point that in their consideration of this problem Aristotle, Saint Albert, and Saint Thomas were concerned with nature in general, but for reasons of brevity only finality in living things will be considered in this paper. This, however, is not to exclude finality from non-living things.

According to Aristotle and Saint Thomas the most striking evidence for the existence of teleology is found in the fact that from the works of nature always that which is better and more suitable results. Therefore, the first part of this paper will be devoted to a representative survey of natural history.

After the examination of the world of living beings the arguments which Saint Thomas uses to show that these facts indicate finality will be considered.

Saint Albert, Saint Thomas, and Aristotle then give the principal argument by which all anti-teleologists argue against finality: they try to explain away the facts which indicate teleology and show that they do not point to a final cause. In this section of the paper the modern arguments against teleology will be presented. After presenting the arguments of the ancient anti-teleologists, Aristotle, Saint Albert, and Saint Thomas refute these objections. In this paper following the explanation of each modern argument against finality in living beings a refutation of it according to Thomistic principles will be given.

This question of biological teleology must not be dismissed as mere medieval speculation. Upon it rests one of the rational proofs for the existence of God and the rational proof for the existence of divine providence, as Saint Thomas shows:

> He [Aristotle] says first, therefore, that we must number nature among those causes that act for something. And this holds true for the question of providence. Those things which do not know the end, do not tend toward the end unless directed by someone knowing the end, as the arrow is directed by the archer: whence if nature acts for an end, it is necessary that it be ordered by some intelligent being, which is the work of providence.[1]

Moreover, within the past year (1950) two books which discuss this problem have been issued.[2]

During the course of this paper at the beginning of each section the statement of Saint Thomas concerning the matter to be treated in the section will be given. This will serve a twofold purpose, that of indicating the divisions of the matter and of showing the timeliness of the Thomistic doctrine.

> This, however, which especially demonstrates that nature acts for a purpose is that from the workings of nature something that is better and more suitable is found to result.[3]

When Aristotle examined plants and animals more than two thousand years ago, the fact which impressed itself most forcefully upon him was the apparent purposiveness of nature, for he writes:

> Absence of haphazard and condusiveness of everything to an end are to be found in Nature's works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations and combinations is a form of the beautiful.[4]

The discoveries of biologists since the time of Aristotle have given even greater evidence to the truth of this statement. With the invention of the microscope the cell was found to be the basic structural unit of all living things. Within its microscopic confines are to be found a host of activities. In contrast to the atom (as it is pictured by modern physics) where there is the circular motion of the electrons around the nucleus, and where any attempted introduction of matter from outside is violently resisted or leads to a radical change within the atom itself, the living cell demands a constant stream of matter from outside to enable it to live. Oxygen must be provided constantly. Food materials of different types must be furnished. However, the cell itself is not in the least disturbed by this constant flow of matter, but rather transforms all of these materials into its own living substance.

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[1] "Dicit ergo primo, quod dicendum est primo quod natura est de numero illarum causarum quae propter aliquid agunt. Et hoc valet ad quaestionem de providentia. Ea enim quae non cognoscunt finem, non tendunt in finem nisi ut directa ab aliquo cognoscente, sicut sagitta a sagittante: unde si natura operetur propter finem, necesse est quod ab aliquo intelligente ordinetur; quod est providentiae opus." (Saint Thomas, *In Octo Libros Physicorum* [ed. Leonina, vol. II, *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Poly., 1884], II, Lectio XII, No. 1.)

[2] G. Sommerhoff, *Analytical Biology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), and Edmund Sinnott, *Cell and Psyche: The Biology of Purpose* (Chapel Hill, N. C., University of North Carolina Press, 1950).

[3] "Hoc autem est quod maxime demonstrat naturam propter aliquid operari, quod ex operatione naturae semper invenitur aliquid fieri quanto melius et commodius esse potest . . ." (Saint Thomas, *op. cit.*, II, Lectio XII, No. 3.)

[4] Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* (ed. Ross, vol. V, *The Works of Aristotle Translated into English;* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1912) I, chap. 5, 645a 23-25.

Furthermore, the cell can reproduce itself, either by dividing into two daughter cells by simple fission or by the complex process of mitosis. The great directedness of cell activity toward reproducing itself is best seen in the reproduction of some multicellular animal, for example, the Amphioxus, one of the pre-vertebrates. This reproductive process has its origin in a single fertilized cell. The fertilized egg cell undergoes a series of divisions at the end of which it has become a solid cluster of cells, the morula. Then a cavity begins to form inside the cluster of cells until the mass begins to resemble a hollow rubber ball. This stage is called the blastula stage. During this stage some of the cells lag behind a little and begin to grow a little larger instead of dividing. At the beginning of the gastrula stage these enlarged cells begin to push up into the center of the hollow ball of cells. This process, called invagination, leads to the formation of two layers of cells, the outer of which is called the ectoderm, the inner, the endoderm. A third layer forms between the endodern and the ectoderm, which layer is called the mesoderm. From one of these three layers later rise all the structures to be found in the body of the animal. For example, from the ectoderm rise the outside skin covering and the central nervous system. The mesoderm leads to the formation of most of the muscles. The endoderm gives rise to the lining of the alimentary tract.

Thus the entire process of development is ordered to the formation of the whole animal. Tenaciously even the single cell tries to reproduce the individual from which it came. When the fertilized egg cell has begun the process of cleavage and has split into two cells, if one of these cells is separated from the other, it alone will grow into the whole organism. J. Holtfreter[5] gives the following illustration of this striving to achieve the perfection of the whole animal. Several pieces of the early gastrula stage of *Amblystoma punctatum*, a type of salamander, were cut out and exposed to alkali for ten minutes. As a result of this treatment the tissues disintegrated into a heap of single ameboid cells. These cells were stirred with a glass needle. The alkali suspension fluid was then neutralized. In spite of this treatment the cells began to reform into several spherical bodies, and on the following days a certain amount of reorganization began to occur. This led to a sorting into two layers. All of the mesodermal cells disappeared from the surface positions into the interior. The ectodermal cells formed a continuous surface layer. The internal mass of mesodermal cells became further distinguished into a notochord, which is a skeletal supporting rod found in the developmental stages of the vertebrates, that is, animals that possess a backbone. Also formed from the mesodermal cells were the kidneys. E. S. Russell, commenting on this experiment, notes:

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[5] J. Holtfreter, "Growth in Relation to Differentiation and Morphogenesis," *Society for Experimental Biology, Symposia* (2, Cambridge, 1948) 21, quoted in E. S. Russell, "The 'Drive' Element in Life," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,* I (August, 1950), 111-2.

> In this remarkable case, through directive cell migrations, selective cellular adhesions and mutual inductive action, there was formed from quite abnormal beginnings an approximation to normal organization. The complex activities concerned have all the appearance of co-operative strivings to reach a normal end in conditioning quite unprecedented in the history of the race.[6]

Among the simplest plants is found a strange group called the slime molds, which possess the characteristics of plants during part of their life-cycle and the characteristics of animals during another part. For example, in a group of slime molds known as the *Acrasiaceae* the individuals take the form of single cells. These cells feed on certain types of bacteria found in decaying vegetable matter and multiply by simple fission. When this process of multiplication has gone on for a certain period of time, the individual cells cease to feed, divide, and grow. Instead, they stream toward a number of centers from all directions to form small elongated masses about one or two millimeters in length. The individual cells do not form one organism but keep their individuality. The whole mass creeps over the surface until it comes to a relatively dry and exposed surface, where the mass settles down and gathers together into a rounded body. Certain cells fasten themselves to the surface and form a firm disk. Other cells become thick-walled and form the base of a vertical stalk. Still others begin to climb up over their neighbors until they have formed a stalk of several millimeters height. At the top of this stalk a group of cells forms a spherical mass; every cell in this mass is converted into a round, thick-walled spore, which dries out and blows away to become the start of a new colony.[7] It must be remembered that the organism which performed this strange feat is one of the simplest of all living things known, for it belongs to the lowest phylum of plants, the thallophytes.

Among the simple animals marvels are also to be found. The least complex of all multicellular animals are the sponges. In fact, it was less than a century ago that definite proof was given that they were not plants, but animals. The simplest type of sponge, the Ascon sponge, receives its rigidity from spicules, small structures made from calcium carbonate or of silicate. Studies made on the sponge type *Clathrina* show that the following remarkable process is responsible for the formation of these spicules. In this species the supporting element consists of triradiate spicules in the external layer of cells and quadriradiate spicules in the internal layer. Three cells from the epithelium gather together to form a triad of cells in the pattern of a trefoil. Each of these three cells divides in such a way that two superimposed trefoils are formed. These six cells fuse at the center, where the new triradiate spicule forms, each of its rays corresponding to one of the pairs of cells. The three rays begin as separate pieces but later fuse at the center. The inner formative cell of each pair accompanies the apex of the ray, while the outer formative cell of each pair stays at the base of the ray. During this process the entire spicule is covered everywhere with protoplasm. The cells that moved out toward the apex are responsible for lengthening the ray of the spicule, and they later disappear. The basal cells build up the base of the spicule to the full thickness; then they too migrate slowly toward the tip of the ray and build up the spicule as they go along.

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[6] E. S. Russell, *op. cit.*, 112.

[7] Edmund W. Sinnott, *op. cit.*, 26-7.

The triradiate base of the quadriradiate spicule is built up in the same manner, but the fourth ray, which arises from the center of the other three, is secreted by a cell of different origin from those forming the rest of the spicule. This cell attaches itself to the center of the developing triradiate system and secretes its ray in the proper place.[8]

In the lowest phylum of worms, the Platyhelminthes, or flatworms, a remarkable animal is found. *Microstoma,* a small aquatic worm, has been discovered to be armed with nematocysts. This worm does not produce the nematocysts, for they are cells containing a hairlike weapon inside themselves and form the chief weapon of the *Hydra,* an animal of a lower phylum than the *Microstoma* which has the appearance of a piece of string frayed at one end. *Microstoma* obtains its nematocysts from the *Hydra* by attacking it, paralyzing it with a secretion from its mouth, and ingesting it. Within the worm all but the nematocysts are digested; the latter remain free in the digestive cavity. Certain endodermal cells take up the nematocysts with the blunt end of the latter toward the base of the cell. In this manner the nematocysts are pushed into the mesoderm, where a wandering mesodermal cell crowds around the nematocyst and carries it to the ectoderm, each cell carrying only a single nematocyst. The result of this whole process is that the *Microstoma* has an outer covering that is armed with the nematocysts uniformly distributed and properly oriented.

Experiments show that *Microstoma* is interested primarily in obtaining nematocysts when it eats *Hydra.* Specimens of *Microstoma* which had only a few nematocysts ate *Hydra,* whereas those that had a full complement of these weapons left the *Hydra* alone. Specimens of *Microstoma* were starved and then placed with *Hydra.* Those that had sufficient nematocysts ate the *Hydra* but retained only the flesh and egested the nematocysts. Other specimens of *Microstoma* which possessed only a few nematocysts were fed and then placed with *Hydra.* These worms also ate the latter, but they retained the nematocysts and rejected the flesh.[9]

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[8] E. S. Russell, *The Directiveness of Organic Activities* (Cambridge: University Press, 1946), 159-162.

Among the insects almost every species shows some surprising activities. Since these marvelous little animals form by far the greatest part of the number of living things both by the great number of different species[10] and by the astronomical numbers of individuals within some species, only a very slight glance at the wonders of this group can be given.

No more wonderful development is found in any animal than that found in the butterflies and moths. The egg of these insects hatches out to form the ugly caterpillar, which is wholly unlike the adult butterfly or moth. So drastic is this change from the caterpillar to the butterfly that a special stage, the pupal stage, is necessary to accomplish the change. As Edmund Sinnott notes,

> . . . the tissues of the caterpillar are broken down during the pupal or cocoon stage into what appears to be a disorganized mass of "mush." Out of this unpromising material the entirely different tissues and organs of the adult insect are gradually materialized . . .[11]

Among the adult insects there are as many interesting life-histories as there are species of insects to live them. Each insect is specially equipped to live the life of its species. For example, there are the husky burying-beetles (*Necrophorus*) which perform the essential role of disposing of the remains of small animals that die in the fields and the woods. These insects are able to detect their prey at a great distance, and upon finding it bury it in the ground. The female then lays her eggs upon the dead animal and the young are provided with a sufficient supply of food when they hatch. Another form of carrion beetle (*Silpha*) is thin and flat, for it does not bury the carrion but rather creeps about beneath it while in the process of destroying it.

Since the number of species of insects is so enormous, and since so many insects lay large numbers of eggs, it is apparent that if no control system existed the world would soon be conquered by insect armies. To prevent such a conquest there exist a host of insects whose sole work consists in keeping other members of that kingdom under control. Some insects do this by sheer force, as for example the caterpillar-hunters (*Calasoma*). Others have developed highly specialized methods of attack. The parasitic wasps (*Ichneumonoidea*) have an elongated abdominal appendage, the ovipositor, which enables them to pierce the skin of caterpillars and other insects in order to lay their eggs within the flesh of their prey. When the caterpillar spins its cocoon the parasite's egg hatches and the larva devours its host. The special structures with which these parasites are provided enable them to perform amazing feats. One species (*Megarhyssa lunator*) can drill as deep as four inches into the wood to find the larva which has been developed from an egg placed in the wood by one of the horn-tail wasps (*Tremex*).

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[9] *Ibid.,* 23-27.

[10] H. E. Jaques (*How to Know the Insects* Revised edition; Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, 1947) says that of 1,090,000 species of organic life, 625,000 are insects.

[11] Edmund Sinnott, *op. cit.,* 27-28.

There are also many insects which live a social life. Known to all are the honeybees. However, there are several features of their lives that have never been seen by most people. The workers can control the development of a queen, the only member of the whole hive that can lay eggs. When they wish to rear a new queen, the workers tear down the walls of three adjacent cells which have been provided with eggs to be developed into workers. Over the third egg (the other two are devoured) they build a much larger and especially designed cell, the queen cell. Moreover, the larva that is destined to be a queen is fed with a special food called royal jelly. If a typical hive is examined in the late spring or early summer, several queen cells will be found. The purpose of these cells is to raise another queen to replace the old queen who will lead a part of the hive out in swarming. When this event is about to take place the bees gorge themselves on honey and thus become very docile. Then the old queen leads most of the hive out to find a new home. This is truly a spectacle. Thousands of bees leave the hive and fly about the air over the old hive. Then in a short time they all settle down to form a solid clump of bees which may be found hanging in some tree near the hive. At this point the bees may be handled in one mass without any fear of their stinging. Scouts are sent out to find a new home, which may be the inside of a hollow tree or even a hollow spot under the eaves of a house. When a suitable location has been found the whole group takes to the air again and flies to the new home. In the old hive the new queen hatches and begins to lay great numbers of eggs which will hatch out to replace the members of the hive that have left in the swarm. In this way new colonies are established and the continuation of the species is assured, since the destruction of a single colony will not be an irreparable loss.

From a consideration of facts such as have been given and from many others of like nature E. S. Russell draws the following conclusions, which summarize quite adequately the facts to be found in nature:

1. When the goal is reached, action ceases; the goal is normally a terminus of action.
2. If the goal is not reached, action usually persists.
3. Such action may be varied:
   - (a) if the goal is not reached, other methods may be employed;
   - (b) where the goal is normally reached by a combination of methods, deficiency of one method may be compensated for by increased use of other methods.

4. The same goal may be reached in different ways and from different beginnings; the end state is more constant than the method of reaching it.
5. Goal-directed activity is limited by conditions, but is not determined by them.[12]

Signs of Teleology

> It is manifest that the final cause is found in those things which are and are made by nature.[13]

Also beginning from facts such as have been presented in the first chapter of this paper, Aristotle, Saint Albert, and Saint Thomas have concluded to the existence of teleology among living things. On account of space not all of their arguments can be presented, but only the most cogent can be considered. This argument, to show that these facts indicate teleology, is based on the frequency with which they are found to happen.[14]

The actions of living things are found to happen always, or at least frequently, in the same manner. The same animal always develops in the same way from its germ cells. Birds repeatedly build the same kind of nests. A caterpillar will always spin the same kind of cocoon; because this is true, the entomologist need not wait until the moth leaves its cocoon to tell of what species it will be, but has only to examine the structure and design of the cocoon itself.

Moreover, the very accounts handed down to the present time by the great natural historians of the past indicate this same regularity in the habits of plants and animals. Many examples of this could be given; one must suffice. Many readers of this article have themselves verified the following passage from Saint Albert in their own experiences:

> The ant lion is called the lion of the ants, which by another name is called *murmycaleon.* This animal is not first an ant, as some say. I have experienced many times, and I have shown this to my comrades, that this animal digs pits in the sand which have the shape of a hemisphere whose pole is the mouth of the ant lion: when the ants cross over them in search of prey, the ant lion captures and devours them. We have often seen this.[15]

What is the significance of this great frequency? Since the same action happens repeatedly, the whole action is determined. If it were not determined, that is, aimed at a definite term, the same result would not happen with frequency. If the actions of the caterpillar of the moth were not directed toward producing a cocoon in which the caterpillar can undergo its transformation, the same result would not follow repeatedly, since spinning out its silk would give a web one time and a patch of silk the next time.

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[12] E. S. Russell, *op. cit.*, 110.

[13] ". . . manifestum est quod causa finalis invenitur in iis quae fiunt et sunt a natura, . . ." (Saint Thomas, *op. cit.*, II, Lectio XIII, No. 5.)

[14] *Ibid.*, no. 2.

[15] "Formicaleon dicitur leo formicarum qui alio nomine murmycaleon vocatur. Hoc autem animal non est primo formica, ut quidam dicunt. Expertus enim sum multoties et ostendi sociis hoc animal engulas fere habere figuram et absconditur in sabulo semisperam fodiens cujus polus est os formicaleonis: et dum formicae causa lucri transeunt, ipsas capit et devorat et hoc saepe aspeximus." (Saint Albert, *De animalibus* [ed. Stadler, *Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,* XVI, (1920)], XXVI, p. 1586, 11. 32-37.)

The fact that the end is a determined one is also indicated by the means the plants and animals use. As was seen in the attempt of the dispersed cells of the salamander, plants and animals try to reach the normal result even in the face of odds. Thus the frequency found in the actions of plants and animals is not only a numerical frequency but also a frequency that is even attained in the face of every attempt to disrupt it.

What is the cause of this frequency, this determination, in the activities of plants and animals? It is not possible that chance or fortune can be the explanation. The very notion of fortune and chance shows this. As Saint Thomas[16] notes, both fortune and chance are causes *per accidens* only, and causes *per accidens* are indefinite and indeterminate, in the sense that if a cause had no effect that naturally follow it, an indefinite variety of effects might follow from it. Conversely then, a definite effect argues to the existence of a definite cause. Since the actions of plants and animals are seen to result in such a definite manner, they argue to a definite cause: they argue that the end achieved is one that determines the actions of the animals. In other words, they argue to teleology.

Objections and Replies

> . . . we must know that those who argue that nature does not act for a purpose attempted to confirm this argument by removing that which especially serves as a principle of nature's purposive operation.[17]

Arguments against the existence of teleology in plants and animals have changed little since the time of Aristotle. True, there may have been changes in the terminology with which these arguments are expressed, but basically they involve the same fundamental principles. In this section of the paper several modern objections will be considered and then answered according to the principles given by the great natural philosophers, Aristotle, Saint Albert, and Saint Aquinas.

The first opinion presented is that of Empedocles.[18] According to this author, in the beginning all the four elements were together, and from this mixture certain combinations resulted. Some of these were suitable for survival, not because any agent intended that they be such, but by chance alone. These suitable combinations of the four elements survived and are the plants and animals that still exist. This theory explains the apparently purposive actions of nature by the material and the efficient causes.

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[16] Saint Thomas, *op. cit.*, II, Lectio VIII, No. 8; Lectio IX, No. 9.

[17] ". . . sciendum quod ponentes naturam non agere propter aliquid, hoc confirmare nitebantur removentes id ex quo natura praecipue videtur propter aliquid operari." (*Ibid.*, Lectio XII, No. 3.)

[18] *Ibid.*, No. 4; Lectio XIV, No. 2-3.

The theory of natural selection advanced in the last century by Charles Darwin may be reduced to this opinion. According to this theory each parent produces numerous offspring, all of which are somewhat different from the parent stock. Some of these variations are unfavorable, and these perish. The more favorably developed offspring survive and later pass their favorable features on to their offspring. In this manner very different plants and animals are produced. The means by which the unfitted are weeded out and the fitted are preserved is the process of natural selection. Since there is not enough food to go around, a struggle for the available food results. In this struggle only those plants and animals that are most fit, best adapted, can survive, and only they will have offspring. Thus the better characteristics will be passed on, and those making the animal less suited for its environment will be lost. In this manner the remarkable adaptation of animals to their environment is explained.[19] Therefore, according to Darwin, there is no plan and purpose in nature.

Aristotle and Saint Thomas attack this type of reasoning on numerous grounds. First of all, the unfavorable progeny produced, or in the terminology of Aristotle and Saint Thomas, the *monstra,* do not argue to a lack of purpose in nature. Rather, they argue to the lack of some definite principle, to the failure of some other principle of mobile being. For example, a stunted and spindly tree is not due to the lack of some definite end toward which the tree was growing, but rather to the failure of the material principle, the lack of sufficient nourishment.

This point also introduced Saint Thomas' doctrine on necessity in nature. He and Aristotle point out that necessity in natural beings is not due to the prior causes, the material and formal causes, but to that cause which is posterior, the final cause, and is therefore not absolute necessity, but hypothetical necessity. This type of necessity means that given a certain end, certain material must be used to attain this end. If this material is lacking, the end cannot be obtained.[20]

Therefore, the Thomistic interpretation of the "mistakes" of nature, in contrast to that of Darwin, is succinctly presented in the following passage from Saint Albert: "All these monsters are sins of nature that intends to attain some end, which it is not able to attain on account of the corruption of some natural principle."[21]

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[19] This summary of Darwin's theories is based on Karl Frank, S.J., *The Theory of Evolution in the Light of Facts* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1931), 158-9; and Jaques Barzun, *Darwin, Marx, Wagner* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1941), 65-6.

[20] Saint Thomas, *op. cit.*, II, Lectio XV, No. 4.

[21] "Omnia enim haec monstra peccata naturae sunt intendentis finem aliquem quam attingere nom sic valet propter corruptionem alicujus principii naturalis: . . ." (Saint Albert, *Physicorum Libri Octo* [ed. Borgnet, vol. III *Opera Omnia;* Paris: Ludovicus Vives, 1891], III, tr. III, chap. 3, 169.)

The theory of natural selection advanced by Darwin may also be criticized according to the principles that Aristotle and Saint Thomas use in refuting those who argue that activities such as have been presented in the first chapter of this paper are caused by the material and efficient causes alone, rather than by the final cause directing the material and efficient causes.

Saint Thomas notes that one who argues in this manner destroys the very idea of nature and of those things that are produced by nature.[22] Nature moves continuously from an inner principle to an end. Moreover, this action is not from any principle to any end, but from some determined principle to some determined end. The action determined in this manner is always found unless something impedes. This concept of nature and its operation is not the fruit of abstract speculation, but rather is a fact immediately evident to anyone who takes the time to consider the world in which he lives. One might, indeed, deny in theory that nature acts to a determined end, but in practice he will still plant corn and wheat every spring and expect to harvest corn and wheat in the fall. As has already been seen, chance cannot be the explanation for this regularity of action.

At first glance, it may seem that this refutation is irrelevant to the objections offered by Darwin. His theory supposes that the material and the efficient causes, the more and less perfect offspring produced by the parents and the process of natural selection are sufficient to explain the origin of living beings and their activities.

However, the refutation advanced by Saint Thomas is valid when the nature of the material and efficient causes are considered. As Saint Thomas has already noted, the material and the efficient causes are the *indetermined* causes. Matter is in potency for the reception of form and must be reduced from potency to act by the efficient cause. The efficient cause itself is indetermined to the production of this effect rather than another, so that it too must be determined. This determination is the effect of the final cause.[23]

Saint Thomas has also noted, as was previously considered, that chance cannot be the explanation for these activities of nature that indicate a final cause; so neither chance nor the material and the efficient causes can be the explanation, the cause, of definite effects.

Threfore, Darwin has seized upon the two potential and indefinite causes to explain the very definite and ordered effects which are the characteristic note of nature. To allow his explanation is to reduce the orderly and definite to the confused and indeterminate, and thus to destroy the significance of nature and the things of nature.

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[22] Saint Thomas, *op. cit.*, II, Lectio XIV, No. 7.

[23] *Ibid.*, Lectio X, No. 15, *Summa Theologiae* (ed. Leonina, vol. VI, *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Poly., 1891), I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

The second argument raised against finality in nature is that living beings do not operate for an end because they do not deliberate. This is probably the objection most often raised today, for modern biologists object to teleology on the grounds that it involves placing a rational mind in every living being that acts for an end.

An example of this kind of objection is found in the book *Analytical Biology,* by G. Sommerhoff, which appeared last year. Professor Sommerhoff notes many examples of actions by living beings such as have been presented in the first part of this paper to show that living beings act for an end. He notes that these actions are a characteristic of living things:

> What are the fundamental characteristics of observed life in the sense of the preceding section? If we abandon scientific exactitude and provisionally attempt to express these fundamental characteristics of living systems in non-scientific and largely metaphoric language, we may say that they consist in the apparent purposiveness of vital activities and in the manner in which this apparent end-seeking or goal-seeking quality integrates the part events of living systems into the self-regulating, self-maintaining organic wholes which we recognize as living individuals. That is to say, the distinguishing character of vital activities is their apparent subservience to biological needs which lie in the future, and to such fundamental biological ends as development, self-maintenance or reproduction.[24]

However, for Professor Sommerhoff these facts do not point to teleology:

> The impossibility of incorporating their [the vitalists'] vague teleological concepts into a strictly scientific description of nature proved fatal. To-day it is fairly common ground among scientists that living nature is not teleological in the sense of employing anything akin to 'finalistic causation', . . . The interpretation of the process of organic becoming, in terms of the 'potential' or 'future' purposively forcing its way into the 'actual' or 'present' in the manner of such finalistic causation, has already come to be regarded as not merely scientifically sterile, but, in concrete terms, an absurdity.[25]

To avoid explaining the apparently purposive activities of nature in terms of final causality Professor Sommerhoff develops the theory of directive correlation, a complex system expressed in mathematical symbols, the explanation of which theory is not essential to the argument of this paper. After elaborating this system, Professor Sommerhoff concludes:

> Our analysis and examples have shown that directive correlation is a physical property which can exist in a closed physical system without presupposing the presence within that system of a rational agent and of conscious mental processes, i.e., of processes which are purposive in the literal sense of the word and involve rational thought, the presence of visualized aims, and fixed resolutions in the mind of a thinking agent. It is therefore seen that conscious mental processes constitute but one of the several mechanisms in nature which can cause a system to have the objective property of directive correlation. Moreover, our survey of the factual background in No. 4 establishes without a doubt that conscious mental processes in the above case are the exception rather than the rule as causes of directive correlation.[26]

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[24] G. Sommerhoff, *op. cit.,* 5.
[25] *Ibid.,* 10.
[26] *Ibid.,* 66-7.

Aristotle and Saint Thomas answer the objection of those who argue that natural things must deliberate if they are to act for an end with an analogy between art and nature. It is evident that the actions of art are for an end. However, no artist is considered to be an artist unless he can perform his art with ease and without deliberating before each step. How the audience would laugh if the concert pianist had to stop to figure out each chord before he played it! Since the pianist has definite means which his possession of the art gives him, he can play the composition without deliberating before each stroke of the fingers.

Nature is the same way. It too has determined means by which it operates, and can therefore operate without deliberation.[27]

However, what does Saint Thomas mean when he says that nature has determined means by which it operates? The answer to this question depends upon an analysis of the role of knowledge in final causality. Saint Thomas distinguishes three different ways in which life is realized in living things.[28] Life may be defined as self-movement, and therefore the different kinds of life are going to be distinguished from one another according to the different ways in which living things are able to move themselves. There are first of all the plants, which have no knowledge at all. They act for an end merely executively, that is, they act according to the form and end that is determined by their nature without any knowledge of this end. The determined means by which they act is the nature that has been given to them.

Animals act for an end in a more perfect manner. They do not merely execute the action, but through their sense knowledge they receive the principle of that motion. However, the end toward which their action is directed remains determined for them by their nature. The more perfect the senses of the animals are, the more extensive are their operations. Some of the lower animals have very poorly developed senses, and therefore their field of operations is limited. For example, the ameba does little more than move about to obtain its food. If the structure of this little animal is examined, it will be found to have no specialized sense organs. In insects such as the burying-beetles are found highly developed sense organs which enable this insect to detect its prey from afar.

Moreover, animals possess a special sense, the *vis aestimativa,* also called instinct, which enables them to choose the things that are beneficial to them and to avoid the things that are harmful to them. The nature of the living being and its instincts are the determined means of which Saint Thomas speaks.

The third and highest way of acting for an end is proper to beings that possess intellectual knowledge. These beings are able to determine the end for themselves and can select the means to this end. The precise difference between them and the irrational animals is that the former can know the relation of the end to the means, that is, they can know the ratio of the end,[29] while the latter cannot.

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[27] Saint Thomas, *In Octo Libros Physicorum,* II, Lectio XIV, No. 8.

[28] Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* (ed. Leonina, vol. IV, *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Poly., 1888), I, q. 18, a. 3.

Thus, rational knowledge is far from being necessary for teleological action. Even agents with no form of knowledge whatsoever can act for an end. Of course, every agent that acts for an end without knowing the proportion of means to an end must be directed by some agent that knows this proportion and gives the non-intellectual being the determined means by which it operates. It is upon this fact that the rational proof for the existence of God and divine providence exists.

This distinction among the different ways of acting for an end is of prime importance in the study of nature. If it is not preserved, great errors will result. An example of this is found in the book, *Cell and Psyche: the Biology of Purpose,* by Edmund Sinnott. In this book Professor Sinnott draws some very erroneous conclusions from facts such as were presented in the first part of this paper. A few passages from his book are sufficient to give the substance of his reasoning:

> In the first chapter the conclusion was reached that the fact of *organized* growth and activity, leading to the production and maintenance of those self-regulating structures so appropriately called organisms, is the most distinctive feature of living things. In the second attention was called to the close resemblance between this biological organization, on the one hand, and the higher phenomena of mental life, on the other. I then tried to persuade you that these two are manifestations of the same underlying fact, whether observed from the outside by the biologist studying an organism or experienced from the inside by the organism itself.[30]
>
> Body and mind are simply two aspects of the same biological phenomena, The first is no more real than the second, for they are one. The pulling together of matter into an organized living experience is what we feel as mental experience.[31]

With one final quotation the full import of Professor Sinnott's theory may be presented:

> It is a lofty conception, I think, to regard the soaring spirit of man, which creates beauty, strives for knowledge, and aspires to an understanding of the mysteries of the universe, as rooted in the same vital processes which fashion his limbs and time the beating of his heart; to look upon the inspiration which welled up in Shakespeare's mind as he wrote *Hamlet* or in Beethoven's to find expression in the *Ninth Symphony,* or the imagination which pictured the "Last Supper" to Leonardo before he transferred it to the chapel wall, or the vision of Saint Francis in the Portiuncula, as but loftier expressions of that same creative urge that stirs in protoplasm everywhere.[32]

With the Thomistic doctrine on the different ways of acting for an end in mind the errors of Professor Sinnott are evident. Beginning with the assumption that all living things act for an end in the same way, he has postulated a completely materialistic system which destroys the spirituality of man's soul and makes him merely a more complex brute.

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[29] Cf. Cardinal Cajetan on this point: ". . . cognoscere rationem finis est cognoscere habitudinem finis ad id quod est ad finem. Qui enim proportionem horum cognoscit ad finem se movere potest: et qui non novit non potest." *Commentarium in Summam Theologiae* [ed. Leonina, vol. VI, *Opera Omnia;* Rome: Typ. Poly., 1891], I-II, q. 1, q. 2, No. 2.)

[30] Edmund Sinnott, *op. cit.,* 75.

[31] *Ibid.,* 76.

[32] *Ibid.,* 97.

In the course of this paper the Thomistic doctrine on teleology has been seen to refute the modern errors that have arisen. Aristotle, Saint Albert, and Saint Thomas have developed an explanation for the activities of animals and plants that neither reduces them to mere machines nor explains their actions in anthropomorphic concepts. Saint Albert and Saint Thomas have shown that the wonderful activities to be found in nature point directly to their Creator, without whose divine planning they would never come into being or survive. Thus it is that Saint Thomas can conclude his treatment of final causality in nature with the following definition of nature that expresses all the marvels and beauty that are in store for him who stops to examine plants and animals ". . . nature is nothing else than the plan of a certain art, namely the divine art, imprinted on things, by which the things themselves are moved to determined ends."[33]

Dennis Zusy, O.P.

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[33] ". . . natura nihil est quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum: . . ." (Saint Thomas, *In Octo Libros Physicorum,* II, Lectio XIV, No. 8.)

SENSE KNOWLEDGE

WHENEVER WE HAPPEN upon a strange term that we have not seen before, we may consult the dictionary or some other source book to learn its precise meaning. Too often, however, we simply glide over the unknown word, assured that we will soon discover its significance from the context. Due to these undisciplined habits of study, we continue to use our newly acquired term as if we were thoroughly cognizant of its real meaning. 'Sensible species' is just such a term. It is bandied about with more freedom than it deserves. True enough, it is commonly accepted and used to signify some sort of medium in sense cognition, but its full content often remains a mystery. Lack of precision in our thinking and speaking may lead to confusion. The underlying reason for this confusion is our failure to distinguish the various aspects to be found in the sensible species. The purpose of this paper will be to attempt to clarify the meaning of the term by indicating its nature and role in sense cognition.

Since we are confining ourselves to knowledge in the senses, we will discuss 1) the nature of sense knowledge; 2) the means by which we know, the sense faculty; 3) the mutations occurring in this faculty; 4) the medium of sense knowledge, the sensible species: in general and in particular; 5) the difference between it, the expressed species, and the physical changes in the organ.

When we see a snow-capped mountain, a green book, or a friend, we can truly say that our eye possesses these things in some manner. Through the vital activity of knowledge we have united these objects to ourselves in a most intimate way. Although we have been changed to the extent that we have now acquired an additional perfection, it is obvious that the object itself has suffered no change. It is still a mountain, book, or person. And from experience we are equally certain that the physical object has not penetrated our senses. It is quite impossible for a towering mountain to pass physically into our eye. Hence, we conclude that when we are actually seeing a colored object, that is, when our faculty has been placed in operation, in second act, there is some kind of union betwen the object and our eye. The nature of this cognoscitive union will be made clearer if we examine the differences existing between beings which are capable of knowledge and those which are not.

What primarily distinguishes a knower from a non-knower is that the former is not only able to be what it is by reason of its own form, but is also endowed with the capacity of drawing to itself the forms of other things. A non-knower is strictly limited to the one form which it already possesses. Any objects presented to it will be received or assimilated in such a way that they no longer retain their own nature, but form a composite with it. For example, when food is broken down by metabolism and digested it is added to the substance of a plant to build new cells. A knower, on the other hand, receives the form of its object, but does not change the nature of the object. It leaves it in its otherness. The one form of brown inhering in the bark of a tree really belongs to the tree. Yet because it can also be sensed by an eye, which is superior in nature to the tree, the form of brown is possessed more perfectly by the eye. The eye, however, does not become brown *simpliciter* but *quodammodo.* For this added perfection is in the order of knowledge, not merely in the order of nature. Therefore, the basic difference between them is that the knower is united to the form or perfection of another thing, precisely as the perfection of an other thing, as its own and the other's; the non-knower possesses the form as its own perfection, not as another's.

A further characteristic differentiating knowers and non-knowers is the mode by which they receive a sensible form. Since both are capable, in a sense, of being united to a form without matter, a further distinction must be made. This distinction lies in the mode of reception. We will point out why this distinction is necessary before explaining it. Every agent, such as a typewriter, acts by reason of its form and not its matter. Thus, a stencil, the patient, receives the effect from the typewriter key only as a form impressed upon it, not the same form of the key but a likeness. The metal of the key certainly does not pass from the typewriter to the stencil, nor does the same form. The knower receives and knows the *same form.* This reception of a form without the matter of the agent is common to all patients that are acted upon formally by an agent. Therefore, the difference must be found in the mode of reception on the part of the patient.

Objective Union

A form can be received by a patient in two ways. First, if the same dispositions are had in both patient and agent, the form will be received by both according to the same mode of existence. For instance, when water is heated, it acquires the accidental form of heat in the same way as fire does, that is, according to its natural mode of existence. The heat is united to water as an accidental form to a substance. The water gains a new degree of heat as one of its own perfections. It does not leave the form in its otherness. The principle behind this is that "whatever is received in another is received after the manner of the one receiving."[1] In this first way the form is said to be obtained with matter inasmuch as it finds the same material dispositions awaiting it in the patient which it had in the agent. The second way, however, is according to a different mode of existence. Like material dispositions for the form are not had in the agent and patient. Hence, the accidental form is not received into the matter of the patient subjectively but objectively. The patient is made one with the agent non-compositively, but "inasmuch as the patient is assimilated to the agent according to its form and not according to its matter."[2] This is the mode of reception proper to the senses. They acquire an accidental form without receiving it merely as their own subjectively. The form has one mode of existence in the sensible object, natural existence, and a higher mode in the senses, intentional and spiritual existence. When the eye is stimulated by a white house, the form of white exists intentionally in the sight. The eye does not merely become white itself, but possesses an accidental perfection of the house. The reason for this is precisely because the potency is not ordained to having the form united to it in a merely material or subjective way, as matter is usually joined to form.

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[1] "Quodcumque enim recipitur in altero, secundum modum recipientis recipitur." (St. Thomas, *In De Anima* [Turin: Marietti, 1936], II, lect. 24, n. 552.)

After having seen that a knower possesses the accidental form of its object in an intentional mode of existence, we conclude that a certain degree of immateriality is necessary for sense knowledge on the part of both the sense and the object. The perfection or form of a sensible object cannot exist in a knowing subject in the same way it does naturally. A sensible form is confined and individualized by the matter to which it is conjoined, and is the principle by which the sensible is (e.g., hot) and acts in the sense.[3] Hence, the sensible is known when its form is freed from this restrictive influence of matter by its action on the sense. The form is the principle of being and action, and is sensed as actions on the sense. A certain freedom from matter is likewise required on the part of the knower that draws the form to itself. If the knower were not raised above the gross conditions of matter, it would assume the role of a material principle in uniting the form to itself. The result would be a composite being. The form would not be received as known, but as determining the knower in being.[4] Therefore, immateriality, or the independence of the sensed object and the sensing subject from the potentiality of matter, is the root of sense cognition. Only by reason of this immateriality can a knower possess not merely its own form but those of other things as well. "And thus for something to become a thing other than itself, not as communicating in being with it, but as other than itself, it must be divested of that restrictive condition of materiality and have a condition of amplitude, which is called immateriality."[5]

This immateriality of subject and object makes the cognoscitive union more excellent than that obtained between matter and form. To understand how it is more perfect, the difference between a subjective and objective union must be explained. By subjective union a form is made one with matter compositively. It becomes the form of some particular thing which it actualizes and specifies. In a composite the form is the form of this individual composite being. Hence, there is no possibility of the form being received as other or as an object inasmuch as it has been joined with matter subjectively. By an objective union the form known is in the knower immaterially, not merely as its own but as the other's. The restrictive element is missing from this kind of union. The form is individualized and rendered incommunicable, but it has the note of otherness or objectivity (the individual form is sensed — not the universal, which is only in the intellect). By reason of this objective union the knower, acquiring an object-form, is not a potency actuated by a form, but is the form itself. Moreover, this mode of union differs *per se* from the manner in which matter is united to form, both in regard to unity of action and being. The proof of greater unity appears in the fact that knower and known are so closely linked to each other that no third being or composite is produced. The knower is not a potency determined and actuated by the form, because in knowing it possesses the form as an act united to act, as having its own form and the other's. The act of the sensible object becomes one with the act of the operation of the knower, and each acts by the same form. For "the sensible in act and the sense in act are one."[6] The second *per se* difference is in being. Before an object is known, the knower is potentially the same as the sensible. After the knower is placed in operation it is the same as the sensed object because it has the same form. In distinction to this is the fact that matter and form are never one, neither acually nor potentially.[7] Therefore, the union of knower and known is more perfect than that resulting in matter and form.

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[2] ". . . inquantum patiens assimilatur agenti secundum formam, et non secundum materiam." (*Ibid.*, n. 553.)

[3] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 7, a. 1.

[4] St. Thomas, *De Veritate* (*Qu. Disput.*, vol. I, Turin: Marietti, 1942), q. 2 a. 2.

[5] "Et sic ut aliquid fiat alterum a se et recipiat illud, non ut communicans in esse cum illo, sed ut alterum a se, oportet, quod careat illa conditione restrictiva materialitatis et habeat conditionem amplitudinis, quae vocatur immaterialitas." (John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philos.* [ed. Reiser, Turin: Marietti, 1937], Phil. Nat., IV P., q. 4, a. 1, p. 104a, 33-40.)

This real identity wrought in the intentional order transcends the real distinction in the physical order between knower and object. Our sight is really and physically distinct from a color existing in a flower. Yet when that color is elevated to the psychical or intentional realm, a real identity is effected between it and our sight. This must not be interpreted as saying that the knower loses its own form and acquires that of color. Actually it continues to be what it is while drawing the form of another to itself. But we may consider knowledge as a kind of intentional growth. The knower adds to itself forms that are physically distinct from it, and thus increases its stature by identifying them and itself objectively, or intentionally.[8]

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[6] ". . . sensibile in actu et sensus in actu sunt unum." (St. Thomas, *In De Anima,* III, lect. 9, n. 724.)

[7] Cajetan, *In Summam Theologiae* (ed. Leonina, vol. IV, *Opera Omnia,* Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1888), I, q. 14, a. 1, n. IV.

[8] Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., "De unione omnium maxima inter subjectum cognoscens et objectum cognitum," *Xenia Thomistica* (Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1925), vol. I, p. 305.

From what we have seen so far we may conclude that sense cognition is a vital operation, initiated by the physical stimulus of an object upon a sense, whereby the knower possesses the form of the sensible in an intentional mode of existence. The knowing subject has within itself the form of another thing, which still remains physically distinct from it, due to the immaterial or objective reception of the form. Furthermore, the subject and object are really identified in the intentional order, inasmuch as the knower is united to the form of another as act to act, non-compositively. This perfection of knowledge, found even in animals, is summarized by Aristotle when he says, "The soul is in some way all things."[9]

The Sense Faculties

Although the soul is the ultimate principle of the vital activity of knowledge, it employs various instruments as proximate principles in order to know things. This is obvious from the nature of the sensitive soul and its activities. The soul is in the category of substance, while its operations are not. They come and go. We are not always hearing sounds or tasting different flavors. These operations are accidental. If the actions are accidents, there must be something accidental in a sensitive nature to which they are ordained. For act and its potency are in the same category of being. Were the soul the proximate means of seeing and hearing, we would always be performing these functions just as we continue to live. Therefore, it is necessary for the soul to use certain potencies, which are accidents really distinct from its substance, in order to have knowledge of the objects presented to it.

Unlike the intellect, all of these sensitive potencies reside in some organ of the body. The potency is coupled with an organ to form a composite. In giving a name to this whole, we will call it the sense faculty, of which the potency and the organ are its formal and material parts. "The potency is, as it were, the form of the organ."[10] The organ is perfected or actualized by the potency as matter is by form. It is affected directly by a sensible object and undergoes physiological and chemical changes. These mutations antecede sensation. They are the preparatory steps for introducing the form of an object into the faculty. Only after the organ has been altered physiologically is the sensible form produced.

Because of the twofold nature of the sense faculty, there must be a twofold mutation for knowledge coming after the physiological and chemical ones. The first is natural or entitative, the other psychical or cognoscitive. It is manifest that our ear changes naturally in the presence of sound, yet if there were no further change of a psychical character, a violin string could hear its tone just as well as the artist playing upon it. Over and above this natural mutation, therefore, knowledge requires that the object also affect the faculty in a psychical way. Sound waves passing through the compartments of the ear alter it naturally. They cause the education of a quality in the ear itself which we call sound. This is the first phase of the hearing sensation in which an accidental form is received into the matter of the one hearing. If this were the end of the process, there would be no distinction between a knower and a non-knower. Recalling what we stated previously, that the senses are able to receive the form of another thing without matter, we again stress the fact that they draw the form to themselves in an intentional mode of existence. Thus, the sense potency suffers a psychical mutation in receiving an accidental form that inheres in the faculty. The form is not acquired, however, merely in its natural mode of existence, but also in an intentional mode.

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[9] Aristotle, *De Anima* (ed. Ross, vol. III, *The Student's Oxford Aristotle;* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942), III, ch. 8, 431b, 21.

[10] "Potentia enim est quasi forma organi." (St. Thomas, *In Anima,* II, lect. 24, n. 555.)

The importance of this twofold change in the sense faculty demands a fuller explanation. The faculty of sense "is a certain passive potency, which is destined to be changed by an external sensible."[11] By reason of the potency's ability to be affected immaterially and the organ materially, two mutations must take place. The first one is natural or physical, occurring in the organ. The sensible form is received by it as matter receives its form, compositively and according to its natural existence. This change indicates that "a quality is received in the patient as it exists naturally, just as when something is cooled or heated or moved locally."[12] "But for the sense to operate, a spiritual mutation is required by which an intention of the sensible form is produced in the organ of the sense."[13] The second modification is spiritual or psychical. A form is united to the potency according to an intentional mode of existence. For example, when we hear a melody, our ear is impressed with a sensible form, but does not become a melodious ear because the union is effected in an immaterial and psychic manner. In reasoning to this spiritual change, we must always keep in mind our starting point, the fact that there is some kind of union between our potencies and the sensed object. We know from experience that we do sense the things around us. Proceeding back from this certain fact, we are seeking an explanation of how it is possible. And we are led to say that this necessary psychical mutation is the reception of a sensible form in the faculty according to a different mode of existence than that which it enjoys in the world outside of us.

Although the sense potency has of itself the power to produce vitally the act of sensation, nevertheless, it depends upon an object to concur with it in this act. Every agent strives to render the effect similar to itself, as far as possible, but a potency actively eliciting its operation is a unique sort of agent. It must be assimilative in a vital fashion. Beyond the ordinary assimilation effected by an agent it tends to draw and unite the object to itself. The eye, however, does not attempt to make itself colored, but only to make a colored object like itself. This vital assimilation and union, or tendency toward the object, demands that the object also take part in sensation. If it were sufficient for knowledge to terminate in the object, the potency would have to tend toward some particular object in a definite way. Yet the potency is indifferent to many objects. It is passive and undetermined. "For everything which is in potency to something and capable of receiving it, lacks that to which it is in potency, and can receive."[14] The eye is ordained to color in general and not just to blue or red.[15] If it were able of itself to know a particular color, it would already have the form of *this* color in it, not merely subjectively but objectively. Consequently, the eye would know only the one color to which it had an affinity. Experience obviously does not confirm this. Therefore, it must be the object that determines the potency to know one object rather than another.

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[11] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 3.

[12] ". . . qualitas recipitur in patiente secundum esse naturae, sicut cum aliquid infrigidatur vel calefit aut movetur secundum locum." (*In De Anima*, II, lect. 13, n. 418.)

[13] Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus." (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 3.)

When a sensible object acts upon a sense faculty, it affects and modifies it. In relation to this action of the object the sense is passive. It is being determined and actuated to know *this* object. However, the faculty is not affected only subjectively by this action. It also senses or perceives something distinct from itself. The eye is affected by a cloud and it sees the cloud. Hence, we conclude that there is both a subjective and an objective modification of the eye. But because the senses are vital faculties which operate immanently, they cannot be affected except by something existing within them. The action proceeding from the faculty is not extended outside of it to cause an extrinsic effect; the effect remains in the faculty. Yet a cloud or any other visible object cannot be in the sense according to its physical reality. It is unable to share its nature with a cognoscitive potency, for it is a creature and limited in being. Therefore, something of the sensible must be in the sense, taking its place and determining the sense to know it, that is, to be one with it. This representative of the object is what modifies the potency objectively. It enables the potency to know the object. Thus, the sensible informs the potency by means of its representative or similitude.

The Sensible Species

The name imposed upon this representational form is sensible species. *Species* is used to signify a beautiful or well-formed thing *(rem speciosam seu formosam aut formatam).* By derivation from the form of a thing it came to mean that which represents another in an intentional way. The species is, therefore, the "object itself formally and purely representatively."[16]

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[14] "Omne enim, quod est in potentia ad aliquid et receptivum ejus, caret eo ad quod est in potentia, et cujus est receptivum." (*In De Anima,* III lect. 7, n. 680.)

[15] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 29, a. 6.

In general the sensible species is a singular, immaterial similitude of the object. It is singular because of the mode of reception peculiar to the senses. All knowledge is brought about by the thing known in some way in the knower.[17] Since sensation is the act of a corporeal faculty, the objects of the senses will be those forms which exist in corporeal matter.[18] The senses must receive their objects as singulars, for this corporeal matter is the principle of individuation. How is it possible for the species to be immaterial, if it is a singular similitude? First of all, it is received without the matter of the agent (not by reason of the matter, but by reason of the form by which the agent is in act) and without entering into the matter of the knower subjectively. A rose acting upon an eye causes a like physical form to be educed there. But the agent rose does not transmit its own matter to the eye. That individual matter belongs only to it; it cannot be shared with the senses. What the senses do receive are the material conditions of the object, the individualizing notes of size, shape, and location in space and time. The eye perceives formally the color of the rose; under the aspect of color it then sees the extension of the flower, its arrangement of parts, and the fact that it is existing here and now before its gaze. By reason of these individualizing conditions of space and time, affecting the composite of potency and organ, the similitude produced in the senses is singular yet raised above the potentiality of matter by the sensory power.

Following from the twofold mutation in the sense faculty, we must admit a double aspect in this similitude, one entitative and the other cognoscitive or intentional. The similitude of an object has an essence of its own. It is a quality of the first species inhering in the faculty materially as an accident. Under this aspect it is a form subjectively existing in the faculty. By means of its entitative information it actuates the potency and constitutes a third thing with it: a determined and actuated potency. Then sensible species differs from an ordinary quality inasmuch as its principal function is to represent an object. 'To represent' signifies that the species is the medium by which something is made present to a potency. So in addition to its entitative information the species must unite the object and potency in first act to prepare the way for actual sensation in second act. Hence, the species informs cognoscitively. It renders the knower one with the object both in first and second act. Informing and determining the faculty immaterially, it makes the form of the object the form of the potency with no resultant third being.

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[16] ". . . ipsum objectum formaliter et pure representative." (John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Phil. Nat., IV P., q. 6, a. 2, p. 177b, 29-31.)

[17] *In De Anima*, II, lect. 12, n. 377.

[18] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 1.

The sensible species would not be able to inform cognoscitively if it were not the form of the object itself representatively. Its role is that of a principle of sensation. It is the means required for the form of an object to be united with a potency. Thus, the species, as a similitude, must have that which it represents contained in it somehow. Just as a picture of St. Dominic has our founder within it, so does the species contain an object. Since St. Dominic is not physically present, he must exist in his picture intentionally. A visible form affecting the eye is likewise existing intentionally in the species produced by it. The form is there in a transitory mode of existence, whereas its physical existence outside the eye is permanent and firmly established. Its existence in the species is termed 'intentional' since of its very nature the form tends toward the external reality.

Most of the confusion relative to the sensible species arises from conceiving it as that *which* is known, rather than that *by which* the object is known. We say that the species is the object itself in another mode of existence. But this statement does not mean that the species is the object of our knowledge. For it is only a principle leading to the perception of the form contained in it intentionally. By means of the sensible species the form of color is in the eye. The species is not this form; as a quality it has a form of its own. The picture of St. Dominic has its proper accidental forms in wood, canvas, and oil. Yet existing in that picture is the intentional form of St. Dominic. Thus, to understand how the species is the form of the object, we must say that it is merely representatively the form of another thing. Since the thing represented is in the similitude, it has to be there intentionally. Therefore, the sensible species initiates the act of knowledge by uniting the sensible thing represented in it to a sensitive potency. Nor does the species terminate the act of external sensation. That is accomplished by the object. The intentional form of yellow becomes the form of the knowing potency in second act, inclining it outward to see the flower in which yellow inheres physically. In this way our senses have immediate and direct contact with the external world, that is, the intra-organic objects. They apprehend real objects directly and not some image formed within the potencies.

In applying the sensible species to the external senses we have been concerned only with the impressed species, since no expressed one is necessary when the object is immediately present to a faculty and proportioned to it. An expressed species is sometimes required for knowledge. Produced by the potency and soul in the act of knowing, it is a similitude of an object and a medium *in which* a thing is known. This term is necessary in the absence of a physical object, in order that the internal senses may hold on to a sensed form. When elaborated by the imagination, the expressed species is called the phantasm. In regard to predication, therefore, the sensible species is more properly said of the impressed species; the phantasm, more properly of the expressed. With regard to knowledge in the external senses the impressed species alone suffices as a means *by which.* For these senses are perfected only by the action of a sensible object. Once impressed by the form of an object, they immediately sense it without fashioning any image in which to contemplate the form.[19] Due to their dependence on the external senses for their objects, the internal senses are not affected immediately by sensible things. Except for the common sense, they prescind from the presence of an object. Moreover, they apprehend an object under a special aspect. For instance, the object of the estimative power is a thing as useful or harmful; that of memory, a thing once known and recognized. Since the objects of these senses do not correspond simply to what exists in reality, an expressed species is demanded to terminate the knowledge of the sense memory, imagination, and estimative power.

From all that has been said it is clear that the species differs radically from the physiological and chemical changes that occur in the organ. The union of potency and organ necessitates these physical modifications. But if they constituted the act of sensation, we would have to maintain that every being, even plants and inanimate things, is capable of knowledge. These preparatory mutations in the physical order cannot be overlooked, yet they should be recognized as only the means for introducing the psychical determinant or sensible species.

As a conclusion we will summarize our findings. Sense cognition results in the thing known being present to a knower in second act. Besides its own form, the knower now has the form of another really distinct from it in nature. Immateriality, or freedom from the restrictions of matter, in the subject knowing and the object known is at the root of this unique acquisition of a form. Because of the objective nature of the union between subject and object, it far surpasses that obtained between matter and form. However, there is a subjective union involved in the instrument a sensitive soul uses to perceive things, the sense faculty. Being an immaterial potency and a material organ, the faculty must suffer a twofold change from a sensible object. The organ is affected physically and chemically to introduce the sensible species. Then the species informs the faculty entitatively as a quality. Consequent upon this is the immaterial or cognoscitive information of the potency by the singular, immaterial similitude taking the place of the object. Like every similitude it has within itself, existing intentionally, the form of what it represents. Together with this intentional form the potency elicits efficiently its act of sensation. Thus, the sense in second act becomes the thing actually sensed objectively. Exercising its formal causality, the form of the object becomes the form of the potency. Act is wedded with act in an intentional union. The act of the thing actually sensed is psychically identified with the act of the operating sense. Such is the perfection of sense knowledge, in which even the animals mirror the essence of God Who is Knowledge.

Leonard Wakefield, O.P.

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[19] St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* (Turin: Marietti, 1942), V, a. 9 ad. 2.

IMITATION AND THE IDEAL

VISUAL EDUCATION is in its heyday. Modern educators clamor for more and better methods for presenting to their students the required subject matter through the pictorial medium. Youngsters of today no longer sail the seas or ride the ranges from the pages of books. The movies and television have relegated Long-John Silver and Zane Grey's heroes to dust-gathering regions of isolated attic and storeroom bookshelves.

The appeal of the "seeable" is rather strong in most of us. It seems to well up within us all with the utmost ease and upon the slightest provocation. It is not without some justification, therefore, that man's sense of sight has been called the most treasured of his external senses.

This fact, the knowledge of which we can all vouch for from our own experience, coupled with the simple truth that every agent acts for an end, are the ingredients to be used to introduce the subject matter of this paper. St. Thomas has the following to say about the relation of an agent acting toward an end:

> An agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end.[1]

Add to this statement the above mentioned inherent tendency for man to look about himself and to take into himself whatever his eyes may fall upon, and we can introduce our matter.

A man's actions must be determined; and it is no trick at all for a man to look about the world and discover on every side a multitude of previously determined effects.

The action of an agent conforming his activities to some of these effects, that is, of conforming his actions to those actions which some other person has at one time or another performed, is called imitation. We shall attempt in the following pages to consider the relationships existing between imitation, viewed in the above sense, and the Thomistic doctrine of exemplary causality. The principal issue to be resolved is this: is imitation simply an instance of the influence of exemplary causality? Perhaps the following question can also be employed with profit to guide us in the journey from the known to the unknown. Precisely what differences stand out between the work of an artist following a model or pattern, and an imitator striving to make his deeds, virtues, and life conform to those of an ideal? Let us now attempt to quench curiosity's insatiable thirst.

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[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* (English Dominicans' trans., New York: Benziger, 1947), I-II, q. 1, a 2. All further references are to this edition.

The role of imitation in the activities of all mankind is of no small importance. Even department store managers have felt the consequences of this phenomenon and along with it they have picked up a few gray hairs. For there was a day when Roy Rogers was King of the Cowboys, but today store managers cannot give away Roy Roger cowboy suits or Roy Roger six guns. "Why?" you ask. Because the limelight has shifted to the Hopalong Cassidy bandwagon. Boys today simply must have paraphernalia endorsed by "Hoppy"; how else can they imitate his heroic deeds and other assorted accomplishments?

But this tendency to idealize others is not something pertaining to the younger set alone. It is a fact of common experience that men are naturally given to imitation. From cradle to grave we are quite susceptible to its ever-present, almost unnoticed allurements.

But it is on the young that it has its greatest effect. The growing bodies and impressionable minds of children, as is evident from experience, appear to be the proper subjects for imitation. Because of this tendency to follow the example of their elders, imitation plays a large part in the education of a child. Fr. Vincent McNabb, in reply to a mother's distressed pleas for advice concerning her noise-making offspring, replied that "Quiet mothers have quiet children." A simple example but it makes our point.

St. Thomas Aquinas, although quite well adapted to the deft handling of abstruse philosophical and theological problems, did not fail to have recourse to the more common and natural phenomena which are manifest in the everyday lives of us all. He noted this natural tendency toward imitation and made profitable use of it in his writings. The following passage shows the fittingness of the Word's becoming flesh:

> Fourthly (it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God become incarnate), with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example: hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii, *de Temp.*): Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man.[2]

As Christians, therefore, we are not cast loose in the world to fare for ourselves in a search for the means of attaining our true goal in life. We have been given not merely a set of precepts to guide our lives, but we have been given God Himself upon Whose actions we can pattern and mold our own.

> "He that followeth me, walketh not in darkness." (Jn. 8:12) Those are the words of Christ, by which we are admonished, that we must imitate His life and manners, if we would be truly enlightened, and delivered from all blindness of heart.
>
> Let it then be our chief study to meditate on the life of Jesus Christ.[3]

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[2] *Ibid.*, III, q. 1, a. 2.

[3] *The Imitation of Christ,* Bk. I, chap. 1.

The *Imitation* bandies with no idle words but opens immediately with the preceeding passage, for in Christ all the virtues find their perfection. Here is our exemplar *par excellence.*

But, as if this were not enough for us, the Church solemnly proposes to us the imitation of the life and virtues of its canonized saints. The whole idea behind canonization is to set certain individuals apart for the emulation of the faithful. The lives of the saints manifest to us the virtues of Christ as applied to the particular actions, times, and circumstances of the individual saint. We therefore have little excuse for wandering from the path of virtue because of a lack of direction and guidance. Our every virtuous action is an act modeled ultimately on Christ's acts, and every saintly life is a life fashioned on His life. It might be said that the Christian vocation is a call to be an imitator. As St. Paul puts it: "Be imitators of me as I am of Christ."[4]

The importance of this notion of exemplary causality can hardly be over-emphasized. But lest we fail by defect, let us employ one more example in relation to a most fundamental duty common to mankind in general. This is the duty incumbent on parents to rear their children. The problem is not one of merely seeing that children are exposed to the three R's. The particular vocation of parents is that of forming a child to the perfect image and likeness of God. At birth the child bears a twofold likeness: a faint likeness to its parents and also a faint likeness to God — but not a perfect image of either. A child is like his parents as possessing the same human nature; but along with the standard equipment which we all derive from our parents, the child likewise becomes the recipient of many other accidental characteristics as a direct result of parental influence. Fr. McNabb's distraught mother of the preceding page by her own conduct indubitably contributed to the condition of her noisy child. The oft repeated phrase, "a chip off the old block," testifies to the prevalence of the power of parental example.

But the child is also like God, in that he is alive with a spiritual soul throbbing within him. It is in virtue of this soul with its faculties of intellect and will, that the child is called the image of God. But since God is exhaustive knowledge, boundless love, and ineffable joy, the child can ever become a more perfect and more exact image of God. The child, as the rest of mankind, has been called to be perfect in grace, as God is in nature. It is the duty of parents to aid their children in attaining this perfection. They are to share the Divine Artistry in forming and shaping a child to the image and likeness of God. In this regard, parents can be likened to portrait painters; they paint the likeness of God, namely, man. And in the process they leave the stamp of their own artistry on the child. Viewed in this light, parents might well be called the practitioners of the finest of arts: that of forming a child of God to the perfect image and likeness of God.

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[4] I Cor., 11:1.

So much for an attempt to stress the importance of our problem. We must now undertake an investigation of the more particular notions contained in our questions as put forth in our introduction.

When dealing with the notion of exemplary causality the student is usually confronted with the example of an architect and his plan for a house, or with the case of a sculptor faced with the job of making a statue from a model. Examples of this sort involve three concepts: first, that of a model or pattern to be followed; secondly, the agent performing the necessary work; and lastly, the presence of some material to be worked upon, that is, some third object. By introducing the notion of imitation, however, we reduce these three constituents to two. For in imitation the agent performing the work is, at the same time, the term of his activities. That is, the object or material to be worked upon is the agent himself.

Let us cite the example of the poor fellow who wants to become an expert fly caster. In order to get the "big ones" up at Cedar River he has to throw his lure in those inaccessible spots where they all lie waiting, and a good and effective way to do this is with a fly rod. Our neophyte fly caster, being a prudent chap, would first of all acquire a book containing the fundamentals of fly casting. Having eagerly digested its contents, he would probably seek out some person skilled in this art and ask for a demonstration. With a competent guide obtained, our hopeful fisherman would concentrate on the every action of his guide. Each detail — the placing of the feet, the grip on the handle, the play of the line, the smooth and easy whip of the rod — would be carefully observed. This period of watching would then be followed by the actual imitation of these very same acts on the part of our future fisherman. It is by means of the actual imitation that the art of fly casting is produced in our beginner. The repetition of each particular detail brings about an increased efficiency in the total result. The point to be observed is that our newly-formed angler has reproduced a number of determinate effects, not on some third object, but within himself.

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Before proceeding any further, we should direct our attention to a more thorough understanding of what is meant by an exemplar. Up to now we have been giving merely a few general notions of what we mean by imitation, presupposing all along some vague or general notion of exemplary causality. To avoid any unnecessary wanderings let us follow along with St. Thomas in his search for a definition of the exemplar.

The form of a thing can be taken in three senses: 1) the form *from which* a thing is produced, as when the formation of an effect proceeds from the form of the agent. Such is the case in any natural generation, e.g., when fire produces fire or a dog has pups. 2) The form of something *according to which* the thing is what it is; as the soul is the form of man, and the figure of a statue is the form of the copper. In this case, reference is made to the formal intrinsic cause. 3) The form of that *to the likeness of which* something is made; and this is the form of the exemplar, to the likeness of which something is constituted. And in this signification the exemplar is commonly referred to as the idea, so that the idea might be the same as the form which something imitates.

It must be noted, St. Thomas continues, that something can imitate a form in two ways: either from the intention of the agent or by mere coincidence or chance. The notion of exemplar form or idea excludes the chance element insofar as something imitates the exemplar form or idea *per se* and not *per accidens.*

It is also seen that something can act for an end in either of two ways: in one manner, so that the agent determines the end himself, as is the case with all intellectual agents; sometimes, however, the end is determined for the agent by another principle agent; as is the case in the motion of an arrow shot from a bow. And, similarly, the operation of nature, which is to a determined end, presupposes an intellect determining the end of nature and ordering nature to the end, by reason of which every work of nature is called a work of intelligence.

If, therefore, something should be made to the imitation of another through an agent which does not determine its own end, the form imitated will not have the notion of exemplar or idea; for we do not say that the form of the man generating is the exemplar of the man generated; but, we say this only when the agent, acting for an end, determines this end for himself, whether that form be in the agent himself or outside of the agent. For we say that the form of the art in the artist is the exemplar of the product; and we speak similarly of the form which is outside of the artist, from the imitation of which the artist makes something.

This, therefore, is the fundamental notion underlying the exemplar or idea, that it be *the form which something imitates because of the intention of the agent, who determines the end for himself.*[5]

Before we move on to the actual application of the doctrine of exemplary causality to our problem, let us bring to light a few more notions regarding the exemplar. The sculptor working on his statue affords us an excellent springboard from which to proceed. The sculptor first sees his model, and by means of the cognitive process he becomes the possessor of its form in an immaterial fashion. The form of the model to be reproduced now enjoys a twofold existence: one, physical, outside of the sculptor, and one, psychic, within the mind of the sculptor. Briefly, the process involved takes place as follows. The active intellect illumines the phantasm and delivers up the impressed intelligible species to the possible intellect. Here the term of knowledge is reached in the expressed intelligible species or formal concept. It is *in* this concept that the sculptor knows the model.

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[5] The preceeding five paragraphs are a paraphrase from St. Thomas' *De Veritate,* q. 3, a. 1.

But the sculptor does not stop at mere knowledge. His goal is to reproduce the likeness of his model in the block of stone. And from this fact we have brought into play the notion of exemplar or idea. For, from St. Thomas' definition above, we have seen that the exemplar or idea is the form to which something is likened according to the intention of the agent who determines the end for himself. The idea or exemplar then, is not the form informing (*informans*) matter, as the formal intrinsic cause, but rather the form forming *(formans)* matter, that is, the form as capable of being imitated.

From what has been said we can draw two conclusions: 1) the exemplar or idea is neither the impressed nor the expressed species, but rather the objective concept; for the species, whether impressed or expressed, is not that which is known, but that *by which* and that *in which* we know; while that to which the sculptor refers when operating is *that which* is known; 2) not every objective concept is an exemplar idea, but only one that bears an aspect of imitability, or that to the likeness of which the artist intends to form something.[6]

We must now apply the doctrine of exemplary causality to our notion of imitation, striving to see clearly the part played by the exemplar in this work. With the above notions of exemplar cause freshly in mind, we can begin to scrutinize our concept of imitation more in detail. Imitation, as stated in our introduction, has been limited to the imitation of the virtues exemplified in the life of our ideal. If we can find imitable forms connected with the virtuous actions of our ideal, we are justified in applying exemplary causality to imitation. But virtues are nothing other than good operative habits, and the notion of habit supplies us with the needed information. For, in particular, we find two forms connected with the notion of habit; the very form of the habit itself, and the forms of the particular actions that flow from the potency endowed with the habit. Hence there are two types of forms to whose likeness we wish to conform. In the one case we have the form of the *virtue* to which we pattern our own virtues, and in the other we see an *action* to whose likeness we conform our own action. Therefore we can truly say that imitation does involve the notion of exemplary causality.

But this is a general statement and lacks the precision such a treatise demands. The two types of forms mentioned above, cannot both play the rôle of exemplar at the same time and under the same circumstances. Hence, we must investigate the nature of a virtue or good operative habit to discover which form actually becomes our exemplar in the here-and-now process of imitating another's virtuous life.

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[6] J. Gredt, O.S.B., *Elementa Philosophiae* (Friburg: Herder & Co., 1937), II, n. 755.

Man has been constituted by God as a creature of habit. Were this not the case, many drastic consequences would follow and life in general would become a painful burden. For example, if the world were to become "habit-less" overnight, athletic contests would be slowed down to an unbearable pace, for the players would be forced to deliberate upon each of their actions, a process which for many of them might prove burdensome. Barbershops would have to serve meals to their customers; stenographers would be forced to work far into the night to get the day's correspondence into the morning mail.

However, the Provident God Who created us with our many and varied powers, has also seen to it that with each exercise of a power, a special quality is produced which makes for ease and grace and pleasure of future action. This quality is what we call habit. In the order of development, therefore, power gives rise to action, and action in its turn gives rise to habit.[7]

The following paragraph affords us an informative and concise statement concerning the nature of habit:

> Power is something essentially innate, a primitive endowment which is basically the same in all men. Habit, on the other hand, is something acquired. It has the stamp of personal initiative upon it; and because of this fact, it is stronger in one man than in another. Further, though habit is genetically the offspring of action, it becomes itself a principle of conduct and a medium through which power operates. This is its proper function. And how is a habit a mainspring of action? By determining power to act. In order of operation, therefore, it occupies a place midway between power and act.[8]

A habit, then, gives determination to an operative potency. The potency is determined by the habit in a manner analogous to that by which matter receives determination from form. As for a definition of a habit, we can say that it is an accident, that is, a quality, difficult to remove or to replace, which after the manner of an inclination, removes the operative potency's indifference for operating either well or ill. And, as we have seen, our definition of a virtue includes nothing more than the notion of a good operative habit.

But beings such as we have just defined, partake of an existence which is closed off from the channels of direct sense knowledge. Habits and virtues are not the direct objects of our external senses. We come to a knowledge of them only mediately, that is, by means of a knowledge of their proper actions. The presence of an operative habit in a certain subject is only brought to attention by the observation of the activities of that subject. In the actual exercise of virtuous actions on the part of an ideal, the process is as follows: first, the operative potency, secondly, the virtue determining the power, and lastly, the actual execution of an operation of a determined nature.

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[7] Robert Edward Brennan, O.P., *Thomistic Psychology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 260.

[8] *Loc. cit.*

On the part of the one imitating, who is as yet unformed in virtue, the process must be altered. The virtue, as said above, is not something visible, but the particular actions are. Since habits are produced by the repetition of like actions, we see that the process of imitation completely reverses the order mentioned above. The imitator must emulate the virtues by imitating the actions. The order then becomes: first, observation of the particular action, secondly, the exercise of the potency in conformity to the observed act, and lastly, after repeated acts, the formation of a habit or virtue in the imitator himself.

A knowledge of the virtue to be imitated is, then, the first requirement for actual imitation. That is, in the order of intention the imitator must first of all have arrived at a knowledge of the accidental form which was responsible for the particular observed actions of the ideal. But in the actual process of imitating the virtues, that is, in the order of execution, it is the particular action which is held up as a model.

From the statement of St. Thomas that, "the idea of the thing to be produced is in the mind of the producer as that which is understood,"[9] our present treatment would be incomplete if we failed to consider the rôle of knowledge in relation to exemplary causality.

It is a fact of common knowledge that any true painter or sculptor goes to many pains to acquaint himself with his subject. The subject's manner of life, his likes, his dislikes, any little thing that goes to make up his character is carefully investigated by the artist. All of these apparently insignificant and unrelated facts aid the artist by enabling him to reproduce an ever more exact likeness of his model. We can liken this instance to that of a man looking at himself in the three-faced mirror of a tailor shop. By looking straight ahead or to either side, by turning the body in one way and then another, a general overall estimate of one's appearance can be accurately attained. So, the artist, by investigating the physical figure of his model, as well as his spiritual and moral characteristics, has that many more forms to which he can refer when he actually begins to produce his work of art.

In a like manner, the art of forming a life to the likeness of another life requires a thorough, penetrating study of the model. The principle applied here is the same as that invoked above. The more the imitator knows of his ideal the greater the number of intellectual species he has stored up in knowledge. As a result, the number of objective concepts increases proportionately. Since the objective concept, in so far as it is considered as imitable *ad extra,* is the exemplar or idea, the imitator who has a more thorough and penetrating knowledge of his ideal will perform a better job of imitation. But let us now go on to consider another matter pertaining to the role of knowledge in exemplar causality.

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[9] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 15, a. 2.

If a Hottentot from South Africa were presented with a new Ford tractor the meeting might well result in disaster for the machine. For it would be nothing short of a miracle if such a person, totally ignorant of the purpose and functions of a new Ford tractor, were to climb aboard and put it through its paces. Even if we were to dispatch to our Hottentot friend a person who had learned his tractor driving on a much older model his instruction would remain incomplete. For even the instructor, unaware of the use of the many new gadgets and the latest improvements, could not demonstrate to his pupil all the potential uses and capacities of the machine.

The preceding example can illustrate the importance of knowledge in imitation. For just as the Hottentot would have difficulty in learning to operate a tractor on his own, so also, the Christian would encounter extreme difficulties if he had to guess unaided at God's ideal of a virtuous life. And just as the instructor trained on the old style tractor could not completely reveal all the capabilities of the new tractor, so the Christian would likewise still have his difficulties if he had only ordinary men and women to reveal to him the possible development of human capacities.

We have already mentioned that the Christian has no excuse for claiming that he lacks a model for virtuous action. Christ is the magnificent living exemplar, quite sufficient for men of all ages. And the Church, by encouraging its members to meditate on the life and actions of Christ, is merely stressing (although not as explicitly as above) the role of knowledge in exemplary causality.

But now we must come to a stop, look back on where we have been, and provide a few of the answers for which we have been searching. The differences which stand out between the work of an artist making his work of art conform to the model he contemplates and an imitator making his deeds and virtues and life resemble those of an ideal, should have become sufficiently obvious. Assuming this much as clear then, we shall devote the remainder of our effort to the explanation of our affirmative answer to the question: Is imitation simply an instance of the influence of exemplary causality?

We can find all that we need to support our argument contained in the following idea of St. Thomas. Referring to the exemplar cause, he says that the exemplar is necessary in order that the effect of an action might attain a determinate form.[10] As we have seen, imitation deals with two types of forms: the form of the virtue itself, and the forms of the visible actions which are produced by an agent already the possessor of the particular virtue. We have as a result of this duplicity of forms, a double task involved in imitation: 1) the task of imitating the virtues themselves, and 2) the added work of imitating the same kind of actions as produced by an ideal, since this is the unique means available for the attainment of the virtues.

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[10] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 44, a. 3.

Since a particular virtue is attained only by repeated actions, the doctrine of exemplary causality applies only to the second kind of imitation mentioned above. The exemplar is that form to which the agent refers when actually performing his work; and when actually functioning as imitator, our agent refers, not to the virtue directly, but only to the action of the ideal upon which he patterns his own action. From this point of view, it is imitation in the second sense, that is, as imitation of the ideal's actions, to which we can relate our notions of exemplary causality.

As a result, the imitation of the particular virtue would become the reason or purpose for imitating the particular actions. In other words, the attainment of the virtue would become the final cause answering the question: why imitate another's actions?

But by relegating "possession of a particular virtue" to final cause, we by no means wish to strip the notion of final cause from the particular action of our ideal, insofar as it is now considered as an exemplar. For under certain aspects we can relate the exemplar *as such,* to efficient, final, and formal causality.

The exemplar, considered materially, has something of the efficient cause. For the exemplar form is the principle by which the artist is constituted in first act for producing his product, just as the substantial form is the principle by which a natural agent is constituted for producing its natural effect. And, moreover, the exemplar directs the agent in actual operation by forming with the agent one principle of action.

Also, considered materially, "the exemplar form has in a certain manner the notion of an end."[11] The idea is truly that on *account of which* the artifact is made, for the perfection of the thing produced by the artist is that it should attain to the similitude of the exemplar.

However, there is this difference between the exemplar and the end. The idea of the thing produced, or in our case, imitated, moves the agent to operation as end or final cause, insofar as it is apprehended as good *(ut bonum);* it moves the agent as exemplar, however, in so far as it directs the agent in the production of a thing as form *(ut forma).* Or, in yet another way, as the idea is conceived as *appetible,* and moves the agent mediately by appetition it can be considered as end or final cause; however, if conceived as imitable *ad extra* and if it directs the very action of the agent, it then falls under the notion of exemplar. The effect of the end is that the work be performed; the effect of the exemplar.

It is to the formal cause, though, to which the exemplar properly and formally pertains. The exemplar, as we have remarked earlier, is the extrinsic form forming *(formans)* a subject, but not informing *(informans)* a subject. It is the extrinsic form which determines in the mind of the artist, the form or species of the thing to be made. The exemplar does not attain its effect (the formation of the thing to be made, or to be imitated) immediately but rather mediately, by the action of the agent. For the exemplar or idea determines the agent to produce a work in its likeness, and therefore the exemplar, through the action of the agent, determines the form of the product.

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[11] *De Veritate,* q. 3, a. 3.

It follows from the preceeding that the exemplar is constituted cause in second act insofar as it determines the thing produced to a certain species, or as it gives species to the product by means of imitation.

Let us now attempt to summarize our conclusions on a more tangible basis. The *New Testament* is the direction book for the wayfaring Christian. Christ speaks from its pages giving to all the precepts and counsels of the New Law. Be ye just — Be ye peacemakers — Learn of me for I am meek and humble of heart. These words, like many of the commands and laws laid down by one in authority, constitute only an abstract norm for action. In our present example, Christ merely determines the virtues to be sought after by His followers. These words pertain to the first type of imitation mentioned above, that which we have identified with the final cause or the reason *why* we imitate the actions of an ideal.

It is to the second type of imitation to which we relate our doctrine of exemplary causality. Here we examine the particular actions. We are treading no longer in the regions of abstract knowledge. We find ourselves with our imaginations trained on the particular act. We have, exemplified in our ideal, actions concerning which we can have concrete knowledge. This particular act is a just deed. Here we see a merciful deed, there a courageous act. The imitator, when faced with a similar situation, or even one less demanding, can, by means of this concrete knowledge, observe an action of his ideal *like* the act he himself wishes to perform. He then performs his own act patterned after that of the ideal. The result is an action of a similar nature, and gives us justification for saying that imitation is truly an instance of exemplary causality.

Edmund Bidwill, O.P.

DOMINICANS IN JAPAN

"WHEN I WAS in the city of Malacca some Portuguese informed me that a short time ago certain very large islands had been discovered in this part of the world, which are called the islands of Japan. There, so they affirmed, our holy faith might be spread with great success; there more than any other country of the Indies were great things to be hoped for, since the people of those islands were quick-witted and eager to learn."[1] Thus wrote St. Francis Xavier to St. Ignatius, the illustrious founder of the Society of Jesus. One year later, in 1549, while the flames of the Protestant revolt were licking at the foundations of western civilization, St. Francis set foot for the first time upon the beautiful island nation of Japan.

Filled with a burning zeal for the spread of Christianity, Xavier went from island to island preaching and exhorting the people by his holy life. Two years after his arrival, he left Japan in hope of entering secluded China, but the following year he died, never having reached that destination.

The powerful voice of the great apostle of the Orient was heard, however, in Japan. This is attested to by the fact that thirty-three years after the advent of St. Francis and the Society of Jesus, there were 150,000 Catholics in Japan, guided by 50 Jesuits administering 200 churches and two seminaries.

In this same year, 1582, a certain Taikosama, the leading *Shogun* of the empire, rose to the position which made him in fact, if not in name, the actual ruler of the nation during this period. While the glitter of newly-won power still shone brightly in his eyes, he looked with benevolent favor upon the missionaries. But his benevolence was short-lived. Many motives have been assigned to his later change of attitude toward Christianity, but the most proximate was the constancy of Christian maidens who refused to submit to his lustful passions. Having been deprived of his sinful delights, Taikosama bitterly took his revenge on the Christians by issuing an edict of banishment in the year 1587. However, Nagasaki, because of its numerous occidental residents, was made an exception. Using this town as a place of refuge, the Fathers of the Society continued secretly to evangelize the remainder of the empire.

The sons of Saint Dominic had not yet penetrated as far east as Japan at this time, for they had only recently arrived in their new mission field, the Philippines. However, with the zeal of their Holy Founder they soon increased in size and influence, under the able leadership of Bishop Salazar, O.P., the first bishop of Manila. The first foundation of the Philippine mission had not long been established when word arrived that the people were ripe for the sowing of the seeds of the faith and that the Jesuits there were too few to answer all their needs. Despite a great anxiety to answer this call from the land of the rising sun, the Friar Preachers were constrained to remain at Manila because of a Papal Brief issued by Gregory XIII, in order to insure unity of government and design, forbidding all missionaries except the Society of Jesus to set foot in Japan.

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[1] L. Pastor, *History of the Popes,* vol. XII, p. 119.

This state of affairs greeted Father John Cobo, a Spanish Dominican, when he entered Japan in 1592 as the official ambassador of the Philippine governor. This first member of the Dominican Order to set foot on Japanese soil had to return to Manila when his diplomatic mission was accomplished. In the following year, the Franciscans petitioned Pope Sixtus V to abrogate the edict of Gregory XIII. Their wish having been granted, a small group of Friars Minor from Spain soon entered Japan.

The Franciscans had been resident there only for a brief time when they were given their first taste of persecution. In 1596, a Spanish ship had left the Philippines laden with valuable merchandise bound for the Indies. Off the Japanese coast she ran into a storm which completely destroyed the vessel; the crew, however, reached safety. In an audience with Taikosama one of the sailors fallaciously represented to the Shogun that this was only the first of a host of ships that were on their way to subject the whole empire to Spanish rule. The Shogun believed this fairy tale, and immediately issued an edict demanding the massacre of all Spanish subjects in the empire. As a result of this rash decree, twenty-three Spanish Franciscans along with St. Paul Miki, a Japanese seminarian, and two Japanese catechists were arrested and imprisoned. Twenty-six crosses were prepared for them on a hill near the town of Nagasaki on February 5, 1597; and as the sun set that day Japan had been blessed with her first martyrs for the faith. These were the first of a long list of martyrs who were to redound to the greater glory of the faith of the Japanese people.

The year 1602 saw the coming of the first white-robed group of Dominican missionaries to Japan. In that year, Bishop Salazar received an invitation from the King of Satsuma, one of the most powerful eastern provinces of the empire, to send missionaries into his domain. Despite the still prevailing persecution of Taikosama, Satsuma and his people were desirous of having the Christian faith preached to them. The king sent a ship for the fathers, and promised them a cordial reception. On the feast of the Holy Trinity, Fathers Francis Morales, Thomas Fernandez, Alphonsus de Mena, Thomas of the Holy Spirit and John of Abadia, left their native province of the Holy Rosary for Japan. Shortly after their arrival the fathers were greatly encouraged by the evident prospects, for they were granted many buildings in which to establish churches and other institutions necessary for their work. Besides, they were visited by nobles of the kingdom who were anxious to lead the religious with great solemnity into the presence of the king. The friars very graciously refused the ornate traveling conveniences offered by these men and made the journey by foot. The entire royal court was impressed by the austerity of their lives and the harmony and brotherly love in which the friars lived. They followed here the same monastic observances, including the midnight office, to which they had been accustomed in Manila.

The initial success which the friars attained, however, could not, and did not, long endure, for the jealousy of the Buddist priests mounted day by day. Although the king had great admiration for the doctrines and the lives of the friars, he eventually weakened to the pleadings of their rivals and had the fathers banished to a small island where they might cause him no further difficulty.

But the friendship of the king was again won when he saw the heroic patience and cheerfulness with which the friars bore the hardships of their confinement. He soon allowed them to return and build a church and house in the city of Quiodomari. They dedicated this first Dominican church in Japan to Our Lady of the Holy Rosary. From here the Dominicans extended their apostolic labors to all the provinces of Japan.

The path was not easy for the Dominicans, and in spite of a labor that was performed only under the vicissitudes of a persecution, they managed to erect churches at Osaka, Nagasaki, and Kyoto, at that time the capitol of the country. Accompanying this expansion was an urgent need for more priests, which need was answered by the dispatch of six more Friar Preachers in 1612, increasing the total number of Dominicans in the Japanese empire to eleven. The names of the late arrivals upon the scene warrant mention, because of the important role which they were to play in so short a time. They were: Blessed Alphonsus Navarette, and his companions, Fathers John of the Angels, John of St. Thomas, Hyacinth Orphanel, Dominic Valderma, and Balthazar Fort, all of whom were martyrs for the faith in Japan. Their feast is kept in the Dominican Order on September 10.

Blessed Alphonsus, who justly may be called the "Dominican Apostle of Japan," was but twenty-six when he left his native Spain for the distant mission fields in the Philippines. At Manila he learned of the tremendous harvest to be reaped for Christ in Japan, and of the lack of laborers in that vineyard. So, in the course of a few years, he returned to Europe to secure more priests for the needy missions of Japan. Although his trip home was not as successful as he had desired, he did acquire a faithful companion in Father Dominic Valderama. Together, in 1611, they left the province of the Holy Rosary for the empire of Japan.

The Japan that greeted Father Alphonsus was a Japan at peace, a peace, however, that was but the lull before a great storm of oppression that was one of the most atrocious in the history of the Church.

For six years Father Alphonsus gave himself to the difficult work of sowing the seeds of faith, without ever a thought for his own welfare or comfort. In fact, his extraordinary mortifications and virtues attracted great numbers of the Japanese people to him, and through him to Christ. His penitential life was particularly edifying since, never gifted with good health, he suffered constantly from disease and sickness. Despite this handicap, he grew daily in self denial and in the grace and love of God and neighbor. It is from this wellspring, this principle, that all his phenomenal apostolic labors among the Japanese people proceeded. Indeed, we see confirmed in his life the thesis that the personal sanctity of the minister of Christ is the very core of the apostolic life. To many pagans of Japan this Dominican priest was the only contact with Christianity; and it was to him that they looked for light, help, and consolation. In his person he represented Jesus Christ and the Roman Catholic Church, a true priest and son of St. Dominic.

During the course of his labors Father Alphonsus was appointed Vicar Provincial of Japan, to which task of leadership he surrendered himself admirably. It is to him that we must accord the foundation of the Confraternity of the Holy Rosary in Japan, along with numerous other pious organizations. Paradoxically, his austere life was knitted intimately with a deep and moving tenderness for irrational creatures, for sinners, and above all for the care of infants; so much so that later historians have ascribed to him the title of "Vincent de Paul of Japan."

When Taikosama, the proponent of the first two edicts of persecution died about the year 1612, a period of civil war and political strife followed. Eventually, one of the Japanese contenders gained the position of Shogun. This unnamed successor to Taikosama also hated Christianity with a fierce zeal, believing that the Christians were nothing but instruments for the territorial aggrandizement of Spain and Portugal. His wrath was unleashed, and by 1614 had burst forth in total persecution. The local rulers were ordered to send to Nagasaki all missionaries living in their territories, to destroy all churches, and to force the Christians to give up their religion.

In the year 1617, Father Pierre of the Assumption, a Spanish Franciscan, and Father John Baptist Tavora, a Portuguese Jesuit, were apprehended while working secretly among the Christians in the province of Omura. Both were immediately beheaded, martyrs of the Christian faith.

Father Alphonsus was deeply moved when he heard of the martyrdom of these two priests, and he felt a strong desire to share their lot. The thought that all those Christians were without a priest moved him to decide to go to Omura to give them the succour they needed. This decision was tantamount to offering himself for martyrdom, for all missionaries in that province were subject to death upon detection.

After Mass on the feast of Corpus Christi, Father Alphonsus, in the company of Father Ferdinand of St. Joseph, an Augustinian, and two native Catholics, left Nagasaki to administer to the shepherdless flocks of Christians. They took the precaution of traveling in disguise, but this proved useless, as they were recognized by the Christians when but a short distance from Nagasaki. The faithful rushed to them for words of consolation and the sacraments, and the two missionaries did all in their power to comfort them. Indeed, the amount of work was bewildering, but they labored day and night until all were cared for. For the remaining four days of their journey, garbed in their respective habits, both priests were followed by a large throng of the faithful.

While they were in a certain village, the mayor, who had captured the two previously mentioned martyrs, came to hear Father Alphonsus. He was so moved by his words and example that he was baptized that very day and persevered until his death. Due to this newly converted friend, the two religious continued their journey unmolested.

One evening, after the little group had finished singing the *Salve Regina,* a large band of soldiers arrived with commands from the king of Omura to arrest the fathers. On the way to Omura a group of Christians followed them, the crowd growing larger as they progressed. The king ordered that they should be taken to a small island so as to avoid trouble with the large group that had by now gathered about them. So deep was the attachment of the people that they followed the party to the deserted island. Because of this the soldiers were continuously forced to transport the prisoners from island to island. During this trial, Blessed Alphonsus encouraged the Christians in their faith, especially by means of the Holy Rosary which he recited constantly. Eventually the party settled on the island of Takasima.

Here, on the first day of June, 1617, Blessed Alphonsus, on his knees before his crucifix, rosary in hand, lowered his neck and received the blows that opened for him the gates of heaven. Three times the sword struck before his head was completely severed from his body.

The martyrdom of Blessed Alphonsus Navarette increased the zeal of the Dominicans and the fervor of the Christians. For many years the remaining Dominicans struggled against the mounting persecution. The prisons of Nagasaki and Omura were continually filled with Christians, and the most refined tortures were inflicted upon them in the hope of making them apostatize.

Among those martyred, the Order of Preachers could also count Blessed Francis Morales and those who first accompanied him to Japan, along with Blesseds Hyacinth Orfanel, Joseph of St. Hyacinth, and a host of tertiaries and faithful Rosarians.

Christian blood continued to flow throughout the next fifty years. New missionaries were repeatedly sent by the province of the Holy Rosary; but scarcely had they entered the country before they were seized and condemned to death. In 1673, the last recorded Dominican missionary-martyr, Father William Courtet, died after prolonged torture at the hands of the heathens.

In France, Father Courtet had been noted for his faithful observance of the Dominican life. He had served as Master of Novices, and afterwards had been professor of theology at Toulouse. In 1624 he was elected Prior at Avignon. During this period his fervor must have weakened, and in this moment of weakness he was unable to resist a violent temptation, which brought about his downfall. As a consequence of this he lost the grace of the Order and was stripped of all dignities. However, shortly afterward he fervently repented and wished to expiate his fault by devoting the remainder of his life to the difficult task of the apostolic life in Japan.

In the company of three other missionaries, William Courtet left Manila in 1636, bearing in his flesh the visible signs of his extreme mortifications and penance of reparation. Having been in Japan but a short while the four fathers were arrested and conducted to Nagasaki. Here, for three days, they were subjected to the most diabolical tortures, the mere mention of which are sufficiently horrible. After being submitted to all these outrages, they were decapitated on the 29th of September, 1637; Father Courtet having heroically paid for his sin of weakness.

A few months after this, some 30,000 Christians assembled at Shimabara in open defiance of the government. With the shameful suppression of this uprising, the curtain came down on the early history of Christianity in Japan.

The Spanish Dominicans made many later attempts to send new missionaries but each venture ended in failure. All the ports of Japan were closed to foreigners, and even those merchants who wished to dock at Japanese wharves were made to trample on the cross as a condition for disembarkation.

Thus it was that Japan, the land which had been the nursery for over one million Catholics, of whom more than 600,000 perished in the persecution, turned her back on Christ and refused to have the seeds of the gospel sown in her fertile soil. One hundred years after the first seed was planted, Japan could display a list of martyrs scarcely equalled by any nation. In 1867 when Blessed Alphonsus, his companions, and those martyred in his time were beatified, the Order of Preachers could proudly claim 110 of the 205 beatified martyrs as its children. Indeed, the blood-drenched nation of Japan owes a tremendous debt to the martyred sons of St. Dominic.

In retrospect, we may ask: why did not the Catholic Church continue to grow, since its beginnings were so promising? The blood of martyrs, we are certain, is the true seed of Christianity. Conclusions from the facts of history can suggest an answer only in the natural order; but certainly these are patent and need but be mentioned. The Protestant Revolt and the Japanese feudalistic system of government are certainly two of the proximate reasons. The Revolt had imbued those Dutch and English traders who flocked to Japan with a deep anti-Catholicism. Their main concern was to gain commercial conquests in Japan, and they used every means in their power to have the Spanish and Portuguese driven out. Still burning with the hatred imbued by the Revolt, they successfully used their anti-Catholicism to attain this end. More than anything else, it was their malicious lies that caused the Emperor, Shogun, and local rulers to turn so bitterly upon the Catholics. The second reason, the feudalism of 16th century Japan, regards more the first edict of persecution, in which the desires of one man were thwarted; because of the degenerate state of the government, he was able to vent his anger in a nation-wide persecution.

For over two centuries the ports of Japan remained closed, until in 1853 Commodore Perry opened the Empire to the west. For over two centuries the Christian souls of Japan were without a priest to offer Mass and administer the sacraments. Owing to a treaty between the French and the Japanese, made at this time, two priests of the Foreign Missions were allowed to build a church at Yokahoma, for the use of Europeans. In a short while these fathers also built a church at Nagasaki, the slaughter house of Japan's martyrs. It is here that one of the most wondrous events ever recorded in the history of the Church transpired. On March 17, 1865 certain Japanese presented themselves to the fathers as being Christians. They said that the village from which they came had thirteen hundred people who had remained faithful to Catholicism. Succeeding days brought new discoveries of large groups of Catholic communities. Around Nagasaki alone there were found 2,500 faithful Catholics. These Catholics, although they had never seen a priest, never heard Mass nor received Holy Communion, were well instructed in the rudimentary doctrines of the Church and used her common prayers as their devotion. This amazing fact is one of the strongest proofs on record for the Divine nature of the Roman Catholic Church. Here is evidence, too, of the Divine Providence of God watching over His faithful as a Father. All human agency removed, we are here confronted with the direct work of God for His Church. The catechists or baptizers in the different villages were examined and were found to have preserved the form of baptism with the utmost accuracy. In commemoration of this wonderful event, Pope Pius IX established the feast of "The Finding of the Christians," which is celebrated on March 17 throughout Japan.

The Philippine Dominicans, a few years after the reopening of Japan, sent missionaries once again to the land of the sacred mountain and picturesque bays. The task was not easy for the fathers, for the age-old antagonism against the Church had not yet been completely extinguished. In fact, another persecution broke out in 1868, and although it was not as terrible as the earlier waves of oppression, many Christians perished for the faith at this time.

Because of the work of the Dominicans in christianizing Japan, the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith created an Apostolic Prefecture, in 1904, independent of the bishop of Osaka, and granted to the care and solicitude of the Dominicans the island of Shikoku, one of the four principalities which comprise Japan proper. In 1916, Father Jose Alvarez, the Prefect Apostolic, had five Dominican companions in the field. Three years before World War II the number had increased to eleven Spanish priests and one Japanese Dominican, assisted by five Spanish Dominican sisters and a host of lay people. At this time the fathers had charge of thirteen churches and many schools. Since the war the number has again increased and there are now fourteen Dominicans working on the island of Shikoku. This ends the account of Dominican activity from the Philippine province of the Holy Rosary. We now turn our attention to the most recent stream of Dominican apostolate into Japan.

In 1927 the Society of the Foreign Missions at Paris gave back to the Holy See the mission in Japan which it had evangelized since 1857. It was to the Canadian Dominicans that Pius XI reassigned this difficult mission, and until 1931 the French fathers remained with the newly assigned friars. His Excellency, Joseph Lemieux, O.P., shortly thereafter, became the first bishop of Sendai, and the Canadian Provincial, Father Langlais, was able to send thirty-six missionaries to Japan, and to place at their side communities of Dominican sisters and nuns from France and Canada.

The recent war did not drive the Dominicans out, and they remained at their work, suffering the trials of the concentration camps. After the war, their work was eased considerably by the collapse of national hopes. The strong religious, nationalistic sentiment of the Japanese has always been a stumbling block in the path of conversions to the faith. With the introduction of democracy this is slowly being eradicated and the burden of the missions somewhat lightened.

The post-war intellectual life of Japan has followed closely that of our Western civilization — perhaps too closely. In the large cities it is not unusual to find many bookstores close together, each of them stocking books which are products of western thought. Unfortunately, through these and many other channels, many of the young intellectuals have become enamoured of existentialism and communism. This subjective block is coupled with the objective one of material poverty. At the same time, Protestant missionaries are making great advances because of the strong financial support they receive from the United States.

In 1946, a Committee on Education from the United States encouraged the foundation of a chair of Medieval Philosophy at the University of Kyoto. One year later Father Pouliot, O.P., occupied the chair, the first Catholic priest to be an instructor in a pagan Japanese university. As witnessed by their dissertations, the one hundred students who followed the course were very much interested in its subject matter. Shortly after the encouraging results of this venture were made known, a second of the three imperial universities, the University of Fukuoka, also founded a chair of Medieval Philosophy.

Since the end of the war the fathers have taken up the work of translating into Japanese the works of St. Thomas. Because of the need of money, the manuscripts already done have not yet been published. But the interest for Thomism grows in Japan, a precursory sign of the illumination of the souls by the fullness of Christian doctrine.

The Canadians care for the four northeastern prefectures of Japan, encompassing six million people. There are twenty-six Dominican fathers working under a native bishop in this field to nourish the 5,000 Christians there. The fathers have the aid of thirty-five Dominican nuns and forty-three sisters of the Dominican Third Order. As can be seen, then, the work of the fathers is not restricted to the intellectual apostolate, but extends to all fields. On June 3, 1951, a clerical novitiate was erected at Sendai, with three Japanese novices, now professed students, comprising the first class.

Last year, the third chapter in the history of the Dominicans in Japan was begun. The Master General of the Order assigned a mission to the Dominican fathers of the youthful province of St. Albert the Great, United States; and in December of 1951, Fathers Peter Houlihan and Fabian Larcher of St. Albert's Province occupied the new mission and established their headquarters at Kyoto, near the Imperial University. Together with the Dominicans from the provinces of Canada and Spain, they are working to establish a native province of Japanese Dominicans. Simultaneously with the program they are endeavoring to interest university students and professional people in Catholic thought.

The two American priests are now very much occupied with mastering the difficult language of the country, a necessary task indeed if they wish to contact the people. In the near future, given the necessary aid, they hope to establish an apostolic school at Kyoto for prospective clerical students.

The land which gave birth to so many martyrs for the faith, may, in the near future, return once again with the zeal it originally possessed to the true Church of Christ. This is not an idle hope. Certainly, the Dominicans now working there for the spread of the Christian faith will be helped through the intercession of Blessed Alphonsus Navarette and the Dominican martyrs of Japan.

Dominic Van Ness, O.P.

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